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It is incredible how important the impact of the pharmaceutical industry is to us. Or 
at least some of us recognized its need only lately. 
While leaving behind a very difficult year which was extremely challenging worldwide 
and especially here in Italy, it made a lot of people change their way of thinking and 
prioritizing what is really important to us as human beings. Health. Our wishes relied 
on being healthy together with our loved ones. And in the middle of this pandemic, 
all our eyes, worldwide, were pointed to them, the pharmaceuticals. We were 
waiting for the vaccines. We wanted this to end as soon as possible while seeing our 
lives changing forever.  
And those vaccines took quite a few to get ready. Just like this thesis. 
Long processes for new drugs. A lot of research and evaluation. A lot of effort was 
required then and is still required day by day in any industry for bringing innovation 
and new inventions. This effort was also required by me in order to be able to finish 
this paper. 
This is how the very challenging pharmaceutical industry caught my eye as an 
interesting sector to focus this work. 
I am deeply grateful to my friends and colleagues in Padova and at the Department of 
Economics. Without your endless love, encouragement and support I could never 
have finished this. A special thanks to my sister Anita, for always putting up imaginary 
deadlines and supporting me through all this process. 
A special thanks and also an apology to my parents, for being patient with me when 
sometimes missing those phone calls because I was focused on the thesis. Thank you 
for your endless love and support. 
I would like to also thank my professor, Roberto Antonietti, for the valuable opinions 
and inputs to the completion of this thesis. 
UniPd, it has been a pleasure. These years of studies have come to an end. I say 
goodbye with sadness in my heart, but fully aware that the best is yet to come. 
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When this global pandemic hit our lives, most of our attention was towards pharmaceu-
ticals. The pharmaceutical industry have been contributing on the improvement of our 
health and quality of life for a long time now.  
This thesis aims to analyse some of the most interesting and conflictual behaviours that 
pharma companies take in order to extend the patent protection of their products. 
Chapter 1 introduces the patenting system, its importance on supporting incremental 
innovation and its trade-offs in this industry. Patents are the most important instruments 
by which inventors can protect their products and guarantee returns on investments from 
these products. Pharma undertakings go through long processes of research with heavy 
investments in order to develop new medicines accessible to the population.  
One of the basic rationales underlying the grant of patent rights is that such rights pro-
vide incentives to the pharmaceutical companies to innovate. They are granted by the 
authorities of a specific country under some of the most complicated legislations under 
IP rights. In this chapter, we go through the patent protection laws and regulations for 
some of the biggest markets, the EU, USA, and India.  
With regards to the pharmaceutical products, they are cheap to manufacture. That’s the 
reason why, each time a branded patent expires, generic drugs manufacturers can offer 
to the market the same drug with the same therapeutic effects at noticeable reductions 
on prices. But when does a patent expire? In the pharmaceuticals, the TRIPS Agreement 
established 20 years as a standard for patent protection. On the other hand, Big pharma 
has been claiming for a while that the patent clock starts way much earlier.  In front of 
the tremendous pressure to succeed and the high uncertainties in the process for devel-
oping new drugs, the limited patent protection might not be enough. So, pharmaceutical 
companies are trying to “play” with the loopholes in the patent system regulations for 
filing secondary patents through evergreening strategies. This can be done mainly done 
by filing disguised/artful patents on an already patent-protected invention shortly before 
expiry of the parent patent. The first chapter gives a full picture of these strategies 
providing also examples related from the pharma history. 
 
In the second chapter, we can look at the dimensions of the global pharmaceutical in-
dustry. Going through the numbers and learning about the latest trends unfortunately 
could not give us quantitative results regarding the impact of evergreening. But luckily, 
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a lot of literature is provided by academia in order to describe and help preventing these 
behaviours in this industry. After that, we go through the provisions and regulations that 
two of the biggest markets, USA and EU have included with the aim of blocking the 
evergreening strategies. As we will see, these regulations are very lenient, uncomplete 
and not fully attentive towards evergreening.  
A different approach is taken by India instead. The country, fully aware of its population 
needs in terms of healthcare has adopted one of the strongest (and most conflictual) 
provisions against evergreening in pharmaceuticals. Section 3(d) will be introduced in 
Chapter 3 together with a full description of the Indian pharmaceutical markets and its 
impact in the global pharma. Known as the ‘pharmacy of the world’, Indian authorities 
are very attentive when granting patent protection over pharmaceuticals. Many have 
been the cases of denial of such protection towards big pharma which under Section 
3(d) of the Indian Patent Act didn’t provide enough incremental therapeutic innovations 
for getting patent approval. We analyse specifically three of them which raised a heated 
debate with the other countries. By following step by step, we analyse the effect that 
patent denial under Section 3(d) for these three cases had in India but also in the US 
market. 
Some important facts caught our attention and raised some questions regarding the ef-
fective impact of this Indian provision in patenting pharmaceuticals in the US market. 
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                                            “With any advent in technology, any technological 
innovation, there is the good and the bad.” 




                                                  I. 






The pharmaceutical industry has been contributing to significant improvements in patients’ 
well-being for a long time now. Today, citizens can expect to live longer than they did a century 
ago. The process of introducing all new medicines into the market is very long, costly and risky 
with high Research and Development (R&D) expenses. In order to recoup the considerable 
investments in drug development and approval, pharmaceutical companies rely on exclusivity 
provisions granted by the regulatory bodies. These exclusivity rights are given in the form of 
patents by the Intellectual Property (IP) authority of a state to the inventor for a limited period 
of time in place of disclosing the invention for the benefit of the human race.  
One of the basic rationales underlying the grant of patent rights is that such rights provide 
incentives to the pharmaceutical companies to innovate. But in front of the tremendous pressure 
to succeed and the high uncertainties in the process for developing new drugs, the limited period 
of monopoly might not be enough. Sometimes, big pharma chooses to “play with the patent 
system” in order to maintain this privileged position through strategic patenting strategies. This 
chapter aims to highlight these strategies, especially the evergreening ones. The concept of 
“evergreening” refers to the various strategies that a patent holder adopts with the aim to extend 
the privileged position due to this exclusive right. Evergreening is common in various industries 
but in the pharmaceutical sector, it is intensively present because of the high financial profits 
that the successful patented drugs can generate. 




1.2. Patents, the lifeblood of innovation.  
 
In channelling the economic growth of a country, innovation definitely plays a crucial role. It 
is key for staying ahead on the game and an industry that turns on the principle of staying ahead 
is without any doubt the pharmaceutical industry. 
In this industry, innovation represents one of the most defining characteristics which is driven 
by and drives medical progress. The pharmaceutical undertakings aim to turn fundamental 
research into innovative treatments that can be widely accessible to patients worldwide. This 
sector is characterized by extremely high investments into Research and Development (R&D) 
which increase the probability of introducing innovative products or processes. On the other 
hand, innovation itself provides high returns on investment. This is measured by Intellectual 
property (IP) rights, including patents, widely considered to be the lifeblood of innovation. 
Patents1 grant the patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
importing a patented invention. They are exclusive property rights for disclosing the innovative 
creations of the human mind and are provided in the laws of sovereign states. A patent can be 
enforced only to the extent that the application has been made. 
Obtaining patent protection is crucial to safeguard the innovative, non-obvious and useful 
approaches used by pharma companies. Such rights provide an incentive for inventors to 
innovate and can contribute to roughly 80% of the overall revenues of drug manufacturers. The 
period of exclusivity allows the patent holder, who becomes a monopolist for a limited period 
of time, to charge higher-than-competitive prices2 in order to recoup part of the R&D costs but 
also to provide incentives for inventors to create new technological inventions. 
However, the relationship between patents and innovation is much more complex than already 
acknowledged in the current innovation policy rhetoric.  
First of all, the pharmaceutical industry is one of the three technology-based industries in which 
the patent virtually equals the product, which is relatively cheap to manufacture. So, patent 
protection becomes the only way to receive exclusivity on the market in order to reap the returns 
 
1
 According to Article 28 (a) of TRIPS: “1. A patent shall confer to its owner the following exclusive rights:  
a. where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third parties not having the owners’ consent from 
the acts of: making, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes that product;  
b. where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to prevent third parties not having the owners’ consent from 
the act of using the process, and the acts of using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes at 
least the product obtained directly by that process.”  
2
 The influence of some States in the regulation of prices and reimbursements for pharmaceuticals has been 




from R&D. Even though developing and launching a new drug involves huge costs, with patent 
protection the rate of return on successful drugs can be much higher than the costs associated 
with introducing the drug to the market. 
On the other hand, it's important to acknowledge that the patenting system has long been 
considered to represent a trade-off between the incentives to innovate, the competition in the 
market, and the diffusion of technology. An IP right always creates a monopoly and with that, 
there is associated a deadweight loss. As a monopolist, the patent holder is interested in 
influencing the market price above the marginal cost. This limits access for users, who are 
willing to pay a price above the marginal cost of using the intellectual good which is below the 
profit maximizing price set by the holder. So, there is a loss and it results in a static inefficiency. 
This inefficiency constitutes a dilemma that always requires a compromise between 
competition policy and IP law. 
Last but not least, the pharmaceutical industry is also characterized by enormous uncertainties 
on whether or not the drugs make it into the market.  
Figure 1: The new drug development process
 
Fig. 1 explains the "infinite" steps a pharmaceutical company goes through on developing a 
new molecule. The process itself is estimated to take up to 10 – 13 years. And once the new 
drug is confirmed by the market, it can also be easily reverse engineered at a low cost by rivals 
- generic competition. On an average of 20 years from the date of application, patent holders 
enjoy around 10 or 11 years of exclusivity. That means that as soon as a drug goes off-patent, 
generic manufacturers are free to launch generic version of the drug and with their entry the 
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price of the branded drug inevitably falls. Since the generic company has to spend less on R&D, 
they are able to provide drugs at lower prices. 
For the originators, developing a new drug can be risky in at least three levels. It is risky in the 
sense that attaches in general to technical success: the path from idea to application is a long 
path with twists and turns, dead ends and the real possibility of failure. Drug development is 
risky from a commercial point of view because of uncertainty about the profitability of a drug, 
if it goes to market - a drug, once marketed to the general public, may be revealed to be 
ineffective - it may turn out to have harmful side effects. And then, drug development is risky 
because the outcome of the long regulatory process through which a drug must pass before it is 
permitted to go to market is very uncertain. 
Big pharma has been claiming for a while of not being able to reap all the necessary returns 
during this limited period of exclusivity. This raises the question on whether it directly affects 
the innovation level in the industry. (Nelson, 1959) and (Arrow, 1962) presented the problem 
of underinvestment specifically in basic research and pointed out that inventors’ incentives to 
be inventive will suffer if they cannot appropriate the returns to their inventions. 
In absence of institutional provisions for inventions, like patents, society would face a state of 
under-provision in inventive activities, due to the problem of free-riding. In front of these 
conflicting aspects, economists have to decide which is more important to society: more 
available knowledge in the future or less accessible knowledge in the present? 
Unfortunately, no conclusive answer is currently available. 
 
 1.3. Introducing the Global Regulatory Background. 
 
Pharmaceutical products are some of the most regulated products in the market. Pharmaceutical 
regulations are defined as the combination of legal, administrative, and technical measures that 
authorities take to ensure the safety, efficacy, and quality of medicines, as well as the relevance 
and accuracy of product information. (Lezotre, 2014) 
From what Figure 1 brings us, the life cycle of a pharmaceutical can be divided into three 
phases: the prelaunch period, the marketing and sales period and the last period when the patent 
protection expires and generic entry is possible. All steps of the product’s commercialization 
are regulated: there are a myriad of rules for pharmaceutical companies to navigate in. The 
patent itself covers the territory of a specific individual state.  
For ensuring efficacy of the drugs and the safety of customers, governmental regulations make 




In determining whether or not all the requirements have been met for a drug approval, the 
authorities compare the claims of the patent applicant against the body of existing literature in 
the field, including also the previously issued patents.  
 
1.3.1.The comprehensive WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) 
 
Before introducing the specific regulations for each country, it is important to start with the 
common base of patent protection. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights of 1994 is the most comprehensive multilateral agreement on 
intellectual property. Its aim is to facilitate the trade in knowledge and creativity, to help on 
resolving trade disputes over IP, and assures to all WTO members the space to achieve their 
domestic policy objectives. The Agreement frames the IP system in terms of innovation, 
technology transfer and public welfare.  
Specifically, for the pharmaceutical sector, the TRIPS Agreement establishes the minimum 
rights that must be conferred by a patent which are similar to those to be found in most patents 
laws. The most fundamental right given to the patent owner is the privilege to prevent 
unauthorized subjects from using the patented process and making, using, offering for sale, or 
importing the patented product or a product obtained directly by the process. TRIPS also 
established the 20 years period of patent protection from the date of application. 
In order to adapt their legislation and practices to their TRIPS obligations, WTO Members had 
some periods of time available. Developing countries for example, had until January 2000 to 
apply the provisions of the TRIPS and an extra period was provided, until January 2005, for 
those developing countries which did not grant such protection for pharmaceutical products 
until the first deadline. While on the other hand, the least-developed countries originally had 
time until 1 January 2006 to meet their TRIPS obligations but with the pursue of the instructions 
in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the deadline was extended 
up to January 2016. The Doha Declaration (2001) recognized the gravity of the public health 
problems resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, afflicting many 
developing and especially the least-developed countries, and in light of its Paragraph 4 
introduced some flexibilities for these countries in order to protect their public health. 
The flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement have subsequently been clarified and reinforced not 
only by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, but also by the 
Waiver Decision of August 2003 and the Amendment Decision of December 2005 to facilitate 
compulsory licenses for export to those countries in need. All WTO Members strongly believe 
that a powerful and vibrant multilateral trading system is essential to create the conditions for 
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economic growth and providing the possibility of generating all the resources required to tackle 
health problems. The next paragraphs present the specific regulations that some of the biggest 
markets such as the EU, USA and India, have introduced for protecting the pharmaceuticals. 
 
1.3.2.The European Patent Law 
 
Traditionally, the EU has played a pioneering role in pharmaceutical’s research and 
development, including generic medicines and biosimilars. The European patent was originally 
created in 1973 as part of the Munich Convention, which also established the European Patent 
Office, an intergovernmental organization that is not an institution of the European Union. Its 
pharmaceutical sector is a highly regulated one. In line with initiatives of national member 
states, the sector inquiry rearticulates the EU Commission’s general policy objective of : 
“providing European patients with safe, effective and affordable medicines while creating the 
necessary conditions for a business environment for stimulating research, boosting valuable 
innovation and supporting the competitiveness of the industry.”  
The heart of EU legislation on medicinal products are Directive 2001/83/EC on the Community 
code relating to medicinal products for human use and Regulation (EC) 726/2004 on the 
authorisation and supervision of medicinal products and establishing a European Medicines 
Agency (EMA). They define the key concepts such as what constitutes a medicinal product, 
and regulate, among others, the marketing authorisation procedure, and the supervision of 
medicines upon authorisation. The Agency scientifically evaluates the medicines developed by 
pharmaceutical companies for use in the EU and also the applications for European marketing 
authorizations for both human and veterinary medicines. (Philipp, 2011) The most noticeable 
characteristic of the present state of the patent law in the EU is its dualism. It refers to the 
coexistence of two different ways for obtaining patents with the same effects, namely limited to 
the territory of the Member State for which they are granted or a European-wide protection.  If 
you need protection in only one European country, you can register a patent at the national level. 
For European-wide protection instead, you can register a European patent with the EPO. The 
European patent then needs to be validated by the national patent office in each country where 
protection is required. Until today, no Community patent which would cover the entire territory 
of the EU and have the same effects throughout the EU countries is available because the 
majority of EU Member States did not ratify the 1989 Agreement Relating to Community 
Patents. (Straus, 1997) 
From the undertakings’ point of view, they have to adhere to a healthcare policy framework 
mainly influenced by patient safety and fiscal concerns in order to benefit from opportunities 
to legally protect their products from product imitation. On the other hand, the pharmaceutical 
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sector – like any other industry – is subject to competition law, which is regulated and enforced 
at both EU and national member state level. 
As outlined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) - Section 1, 
competition law prohibits behaviour and practices that restrict the functioning of the free 
internal market environment. More precisely, Art. 101 of the Treaty bans certain restrictive 
multilateral business practices, while Art. 102 makes the abuse of a dominant market position 
illegal which brings us to the trade-off between the incentives to innovate in the pharmaceutical 
industry (and not only) and the competition in the market. It is extremely crucial for the 
functioning of this market to find the right balance between the two of them. 
 
1.3.3.Pharmaceutical patent’s regulation in the USA 
 
In the United States, the exclusivity rights for new pharmaceutical products are governed by 
both U.S. Patent Law and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) law. 
The primary regulation of pharmaceuticals in the US is at the federal level by the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the FD&C Act), codified at Title 21 of the US Code (USC). 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration reviews and approves human drugs and biologics and 
regulates their manufacturing and marketing. To obtain approval, the manufacturer must submit 
a new drug application (NDA) that demonstrates among other things that the drug is safe and 
effective for its intended use. There approvals are specifically related to the product which is 
defined by the chemistry, manufacturing and control information provided and also to the 
facilities and processes included in the application to the FDA. (Agneshwar, et al., 2021) The 
patent information provided by the NDA owner is then listed for the approved drug along with 
regulatory exclusivity information in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic 
Equivalence Evaluations (commonly known as the Orange Book). The listing of patents in the 
Orange Book facilitates the resolution of eventual patent disputes raised by generic filers. 
In order to encourage innovation and to incentivise the development of new drug products with 
lower costs, in USA, the Congress has also passed significant legislation such as the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (the Hatch-Waxman Amendments), 
which amended the FD&C Act to establish the generic drug approval pathway. (Kracov, et al., 
2020) According to the definition provided by the US FDA, an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA) consists in data submitted to this authority with the scope of getting 
potential approval for a generic drug product. Once FDA approves the application, the applicant 
may manufacture and market the generic drug product to provide a safe, effective, lower cost 
alternative to the brand-name drug it references. The term "abbreviated" for the generic drug 
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applications is used because generally they are not required to include preclinical and clinical 
data to establish safety and effectiveness. However, the generic applicants must provide 
scientific proofs that their product has the same performance as the innovator drug. In fact, one 
of the main requirements for getting approved by FDA, is that the generic version must deliver 
the same amount of active ingredients into a patient's bloodstream for the same amount of time 
as the originators’ drug.  According to the Hatch-Waxman Amendments, bioequivalence was 
defined as the basis for the approval of generic versions of drug products.  
At the same time, to the generic drug companies was given the ability of challenging existing 
patents in court (known as patent challenges) prior to marketing with a 180-day generic drug 
exclusivity. So, other than incentives in the form of statutory exclusivities, the US patent system 
grants also exclusive rights to generic pharma companies to make, use, sell or import into the 
US inventions for even if a patent has already been granted. US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) is also governed by Section 35 of the US Code. This section was amended into law 
in 2011 by The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act in order to implement, among other changes, 
a first-to-file system.  
In the US market, just like the European one, participants in the pharmaceutical sector are 
subject to antitrust laws which influence how participants may contract with each other, acquire 
and enforce patents, settle litigations as well as how they may market their products. 
The key antitrust laws impacting the pharmaceutical sector are: Section 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act, which bans unreasonable contracts or conspiracies in restraint of trade; Section 
2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, which outlaws "monopolization or attempts at monopolizing 
any aspect of interstate trade or commerce"; Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, which bans 
mergers or acquisitions that may "substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly"; and Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which outlaws "unfair 
methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." 
As previously emphasized for the EU pharmaceutical market, the USA is also one of the most 











1.3.4. The evolution of patent law in the developing countries: focusing on India. 
 
Over the past decades, the Indian pharmaceutical industry has been one of the most successful, 
high-technology-based industries with a very consistent growth.  The liberalisation of the Indian 
economy has had a huge impact in the revolutionization of Indian industries making them 
emerge from domestic markets and aiming for international competition. Today, on the global 
scale, the Indian pharmaceutical industry is positioned third largest in volume terms and tenth 
largest in value terms. Known as the pharmacy of the world, the healthcare imperatives and the 
resultant laws and regulations around health in India and also the strong competition with the 
biggest markets like US and EU, are unique and object of interest for this work. 
For India, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health is considered as 
victory because it re-established the primacy of the duty to respond to public healthcare needs 
over the duty to protect the private intellectual property (IP) claims of pharmaceutical 
companies. In 1970, the Patent Act was passed, repealing all previous legislations. However, 
the newly introduced Patents Act excluded pharmaceuticals and agrochemical products from 
eligibility for patents. This exclusion was in order to break away India's dependence on 
importing drugs and formulations and provide for development of a self-reliant  pharmaceutical 
industry. This lack of protection had a significant impact on the Indian pharmaceutical industry 
and resulted in the development of considerable expertise in reverse engineering of drugs that 
were patentable as products throughout the industrialised world but unprotectable in India. 
(Zacharias & Farias, 2019) 
As a result of this, the Indian pharmaceutical business speedily began to develop cheaper 
versions of a bigger range of medication proprietary for the domestic market moving then into 
the international market once the international patents expired. The TRIPS agreement was 
negotiated during the Uruguay round trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) and one of the main reasons for incorporating intellectual property issues 
into the GATT framework was the pharmaceutical industry. India signed the GATT on 15 April 
1994, thereby making it mandatory to comply with the requirements of GATT, including the 
agreement on TRIPS. (Zacharias & Farias, 2019)  
The country was thereby required to meet the minimum standards under TRIPS in relation to 
patents and the pharmaceutical industry. India's patent legislation needed thus to include 
provisions for availability of patents for both pharmaceutical products and processes inventions.  
In 1982 India introduced a new legislation amending the Drugs and Cosmetics Act of 1940 
which also provided for the Central Government to make rules, inter alia, for the cancellation 
or suspension of a licence for a contravention of the provisions of the Act dealing with import, 
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manufacture, sale, and distribution of drugs, or if there has been non-compliance with the 
conditions subject to which the licence has been issued.  
Regulation-making power has been extended to cover prescription of the use of packing 
material that comes into direct contact with the drug. The focus of successive Indian 
governments has been introducing reductions in out-of- pocket expenditure on healthcare and 
drugs due to the absence of a significant reimbursement system in the country. 
As known, the market is dominated by generics thus laws and regulations of the country (IP, 
drug regulatory, drug pricing, prescriptions, etc.) are mainly focused towards governing and 
strengthening a generic market. 
 
1.4. Is generic entry a real threat for innovation? 
 
The pharma industry is unique on its own. While the demand is mostly driven by the 
prescriptions of the doctor or pharmacist (not the patients themselves), two firms - the 
originators and the generics - dominate the supply chain. The interplay between and within 
these parties heavily influences the progress in the industry regarding innovation and price 
effects. (Ndubuisi, 2015) On one hand, generic manufacturers which produce generic solutions 
can enter the market upon the end of the exclusivity period of the pre-existing original drugs. 
Their situation is considerably more advantageous: little or no research costs, no risks assumed, 
not even marketing costs since the road has already been cleared by their predecessors - the 
originators. (Tuominen, 2011) As previously emphasized, the originator companies are actively 
involved in R&D and preclinical trials for market authorizations for the new drugs. In return 
they are given market exclusivity for a period of 20 year, with a possibility of extension 
depending on national legislation. Specifically, of an average of 20 years from the date of 
application, patent holders enjoy around 10 or 11 years of exclusivity. 
By making the knowledge public in exchange for market exclusivity, the innovator helps in 
increasing in some way both knowledge transfer and technology diffusion. (Hall, et al., 2005) 
This also helps in preventing duplicative research. (Kremer, 1998) 
Traditionally, generic companies have always emphasised that due to their presence on the 
market, customers can have access to medicines at more affordable prices. In fact, their entry 
is associated with the falling prices of the drugs due to price competition. It is estimated that 
drugs which go off patent lose up to 80% of the revenue generated by the originators.  But how 
do the generic manufacturers decide which entry strategy to choose? 
Grabowski & Kyle (2007) analysed the dimensions of the generic competition and market 
exclusivity periods for pharmaceuticals that had experienced their initial generic entry between 
1995 and 2005. The results showed that generic competition has increased over several 
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dimensions. First, during these years, an increasing number of drugs were subject to generic 
entry, including drugs with relatively modest annual average sales. Then, blockbuster drugs 
attract more generic entrants hence have shorter market exclusivity periods than smaller selling 
drugs. (Grabowski & Kyle, 2007) In fact, as we can see in Fig. 2, markets with less than $50 
million in market sales have less than 2 generic competitors after Year 1, whereas markets with 
sales greater than $500 million have more than 7 generic competitors. Third, the higher selling 
drugs with annual sales in excess of $1 billion experienced significant decreases in their market 
exclusivity periods in recent years due to generic entry which captures most of the market share 
within weeks of their launch.  
 
Figure 2: Average number of generic entrants within 1 year, by market size. 
 
Source: Grabowski & Kyle (2007) 
 
These results are consistent with several studies which highlight the fact that product sales are 
a key determinant of generic entry and competition. What concerns the economists is that 
generic manufacturers are disproportionately targeting high-sales drugs (blockbusters), 
reducing in this way their market life and showing that just like their originator competitors, 
generics manufacturers are businesses in pursuit of profit. 
Another aspect observers worry about are generic patent challenges which are on the rise and 
that may reduce effective market life of drugs. These patent challenges take the form of generic 
drug applications with so called "Paragraph IV" certifications and provide a means for a generic 
firm to pursue entry when the relevant patents are invalid or do not cover the proposed generic 
product. (Hemphill & Sampat, 2012) 
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Part of the increase is due to the regulatory pathway in the US, permitting generic drug makers 
to challenge branded drug makers’ patents, with a view to securing early FDA approval and 
market entry. Hemphill and Sampat (2012) analysed the causes and effects of these patent 
challenges using a unique dataset of all instances of first-time generic approval between 2001 
and 2010 connected with information concerning every drug’s patents, patent challenges and 
different characteristics. They showed that challenges are more common for higher sales 
medicines and by examining which patents are challenged on each drug, the results showed that 
lower quality and later expiring patents disproportionately draw challenges.  
All this targeting on the high-sales drugs by the generics that are trying to cut down their market 
life may indirectly have an effect innovation within the trade. Along this line, we know that 
originator companies are highly dependent on the revenues from mostly best-selling drugs and 
they inevitably wish to maintain these for as long as possible. So, this data leaves them with 
two choices: defend the prevailing patents or acquire new patents by inventing new drugs.  
As emphasized before, developing a replacement drug needs years and years of investments in 
R&D without none guaranteed success. So, the originators may opt for the “quickest” strategy: 
they involve in strategic patenting (evergreening strategies) geared toward delaying or 
deterring generic entry to prevent price competition or block market entry for other originators, 
try to increase their bargaining power within the trade and self-insure themselves against future 
risk of infringement once they enter into a new line of R&D. All these strategic patenting 
methods affect the amount of innovation in the industry as a result of the increased breadth and 
duration of monopolistic restrictions on the foundational technology and put future originator 
competitors at a disadvantage. The result is a dynamic inefficiency because undertakings focus 
more on the patent competition instead of innovation competition. This limits other future 
originators’ ability to innovate in related areas which may completely abstain from further 
research in the field. 
To stress the evergreening phenomenon effect further it is important to fully understand in what 
it specifically consists of and how it affects innovation and price competition in the pharma 
industry, as well as its social welfare effect. 
 
1.5. Pharmaceutical patenting practices: there’s life in the old drug yet. 
Evergreening refers to different ways through which patent owners take undue advantage of 
the law and extend their IP monopoly particularly over highly lucrative blockbuster drugs. This 
can be done mainly done by filing disguised/artful patents on an already patent-protected 




1.5.1 Defining ‘evergreening’ 
Although there are provisions in patent laws that are specifically enacted to provide innovators 
sufficient exclusivity period to enjoy monopoly3, with time and with the rise in the number of 
generic drugs industries, strategic attempts to exploit the loopholes in patent laws and related 
regulation to extend patent protection especially on what they consider bestseller drugs, over 
the market have become more common. With rising R&D expenditures, it is important for 
pharmaceutical companies to make positive returns from the innovation. These returns can be 
achieved by improving both effectiveness and efficiency of the processes. Hence, various 
instruments and strategies can be combined by the originators in order to succeed. 
Table 1: Examples of Strategic Evergreening 
 
A way can be by filing disguised or artful patents on previously patented inventions just before 
the end of the term of the parent patent. These strategic moves are known as evergreening 
practices or strategic patenting. Evergreening is a strategy acquired by the innovator companies 
to recover high costs incurred by them in Research and Development and as a means to legally 
protect any minor modifications that are intentionally made to patent just to obtain multiple 
patents on the same drug and hence extend the overall term of the patent to enjoy monopoly for 
extended period. (Kumar & Nanda, 2017) 
The scheme is very easy: first the company launches a drug product and obtains patent 
protection for it. Then, just before the end of the term of that patent, the company files a new 
patent for a minor modification in the original molecule that extends the overall term of 
protection. To put it in an example, consider an innovator firm named AstraPharma which 
formulates a new molecule for curing a particular disease. The company applied for patent 
 




protection for this new molecule on 3 March 2001. Once the application is approved by the 
patent office, it will result in a patent that provides protection for the next 20 years, up to 3 
March 2021, starting from the date of application. By July 2018, AstraPharma files another 
application for a minor improvement of the previous molecule. The patent office approves the 
application and it results in an extensive patent protection that will end in July 2025. With this 
new patent, a generic manufacturer can launch the generic version of the original molecule after 
the 3 march of 2021. The generic version cannot include the modifications that AstraPharma 
made to the molecule in July 2018. While for the future originator companies, after March 2021 
they can build on innovation only using the previous technology without incorporating the new 
developments of July 2018. The different attributes of drug development that can be patented 
include delivery profiles, methods of manufacture, chemical intermediates, formulations, 
packaging, biological targets, mechanism of action and method of medical treatment etc. 
(Gupta, et al., 2010)   
Although evergreening can occur in any industry, it is said to be more frequent in the 
pharmaceutical sector where patents cover such aspects of drugs. Firms utilise one of these 
attributes to obtain additional patents shortly before the end of the term of primary patent. 
The debate on the economic, public health and policy aspects of “evergreening” has tended to 
be polarised. In summary, critics of the innovator pharmaceutical industry have argued that the 
“incremental modifications” behind these evergreening tactics are simply a low-risk way of 
cashing in more money on the success of established products. According to critics, this brings 
little or no health benefit at the expense of fragmenting the market and/or delaying generic entry, 
diminishing the rewards rightly due in respect of the originators’ product and imposing strain 
on R&D resources that would be better applied elsewhere.  
In reply those defending the industry have argued that what is complained of is in reality a 
consequence of parallel development programmes and improvement that results in greater 
therapeutic choice for patients, safer and more effective medicines and a valuable source of 
competition both during and after the patent life of the “breakthrough” product that exerts a 
beneficial influence on drug pricing. (Parker & Mooney, 2007) 
It is not the purpose of this work to advance this debate but rather to step back and consider the 
right issues on which the debate is (or should be) founded. The next paragraphs introduce some 






1.5.2. Extensions and creation of ‘next generation drugs’ 
 
A first typical strategy of evergreening that pharmaceutical companies apply is the use of a 
technically minor improvement in form of a reformulation and repackaging of the formula. 
Basically, the innovator company releases a successor drug with a different brand name and 
with minor changes in design, colour, dosage or else, in order to extend the overall term of 
highly lucrative blockbuster drugs and maintain monopoly for longer durations. Then, they 
pursue heavy marketing strategies on the promotion of such new drugs. This type of practice is 
persistent in this sector and there are plenty of famous cases in pharma history. 
The most famous example of this strategy is AstraZeneca’s Prilosec. It was the most profitable 
blockbuster of its time with US $6.2 billion/year and was used to treat heartburn. The CEO of 
AstraZeneca, Tom McKillop, faced one of the biggest dilemmas of large pharmaceutical firms. 
(Conley, et al., 2006) Within the year, the firm's patent for Prilosec (active ingredient 
omeprazole) was in expiration and it was more than a fact that the competition from other drug 
manufactures would be inevitable. So the solution to this faced problem was one of their other 
drug in the pipeline named Nexium, an improvement on the original Prilosec molecule. With 
this new idea, AstraZeneca had also the opportunity to choose between the introduction of its 
own version of generic omeprazole and/or introduce an OCT version of omeprazole that might 
tap into other markets. The main idea was to introduce and move the brand-loyal customers of 
Prilosec to the new version Nexium. AstraZeneca launched Nexium as the successor of Prilosec 
and claimed that it was more effective than Prilosec and other drugs in the same category. Even 
though later clinical trials showed that both were the same drug just with some minor changes 
in dosage, colour, and design, the success and profits achieved from the direct-to-customer 
advertising was remarkable. Later clinical trials4 showed that both were the same drug just with 
some minor changes in dosage, colour, and design. Rather than investing huge amounts in 
incremental innovation, AstraZeneca spent a lot of money in the promotion of Nexium. This 
case confirmed one of the most negative effects of evergreening in pharma industry: a 
decreasing level of innovation. Several major U.S. retailers sued AstraZeneca, accusing it for 
using illegal tactics to maintain its monopoly over the heartburn medication Prilosec even after 
the drug's patent expired. In 2008, The District Court of Columbia (US) claimed the 




4 (Plaintiffs v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP, 2008) – See Table of Cases for Ref. number 
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1.5.3. The Rx to OTC switch 
 
The OTC (over-the-counter) drugs are pharmaceutical products that do not require professional 
supervision and that can be safely administered by the patient status. In these cases, the 
innovator just needs to show the safety ratio to benefit to the FDA and whether it will be easy 
for the patient to self-administer the drug product. The OTC status has many benefits and 
between them we can list the opportunity for direct advertising to consumers through different 
channels such as advertising in television, magazines, retail displays, brochures and packaging 
without any restrictions which apply on prescription drugs.  
The process of reclassifying a prescription drug to Over the Counter is termed as Rx to OTC 
switch. This is another strategy used by the innovator companies in order to maximize their 
monopoly over the blockbuster drug molecules. Normally, the consumer himself knows that 
the new OTC is from the innovator company which he knew before, so it would be preferred 
and choose that one. The effect is that there will be an immediate undercut demand for the 
generic version in the market. To picture this strategy with a real example we can nominate the 
Sanofi had originally developed Nasacort 24 h drug as an intranasal steroid and in 2014, after 
patent expiration switched it for OTC for the treatment of allergies. Nasacort received approval 
from the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to switch from prescription to OTC on 
October 2013, and today is still available on retail shelves all over US5.The approval of the 
application by the FDA was considered by experts as a smart move that helped to expand 
Sanofi's OTC portfolio, which has been a key strategic sector for the company since 2008. This 
permitted the pharmaceutical major to acquire Chattem, the US consumer healthcare 
company, in March 2010, giving it a presence in the US consumer healthcare market.  
 
1.5.4. The Pay for delay (reverse payments) settlements  
 
Known as one of the most anti-competitive strategies, the pay for delay strategy has been 
unfortunately well established in the industry. The originators in order to prevent or delay the 
entry of cheaper generic versions until their cheaper generic version is firmly present in the 
market, sign agreement with the generic manufacturers to delay or give up on the market entry. 
It is a kind of settlement between the two parties in which the latter agrees to refrain from 
marketing its own generic version for a specific period of time in return of huge payments from 
the innovators themselves. These strategies definitely block the entry of generics and are 
 





considered unlawful and Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust agencies constantly look out 
for such deals. In 2008, the European Commission launched an inquiry6 in the pharmaceutical 
sector trying to identify the reasons behind the alleged delays in the entry of the generics in the 
market and the declining number of new drugs marketed in the EU. The Commission examined 
698 cases of patent litigation between originator companies and generic manufacturers and in 
223 cases the parties agreed to a settlement between them. To solve disputes, parties start 
negotiating entry dates for the generic product, either at or before the branded drug's loss of 
exclusivity based on anticipated litigation costs. 
Sometimes, patent disputes between innovators and generic companies settle. Most of these 
settlements start from patent challenges. Generics try to enter early in the market trying to prove 
that the originators patent is invalid. For postponing the generic entry, the originator drug com-
pany pays the generic manufacturer as part of the settlement.  
As already introduced, in US generics can play the Paragraph IV card by assuring the FDA that 
it would not infringe upon the patent of a branded drug by proving whether that the patent was 
invalid or that the sale of the generic drug itself would not infringe the already granted patent.  
This rule wasn’t applied by Solvay Pharmaceuticals which filed a New Drug Application and 
received a patent in 2003 for its brand-name drug, Androgel. Actavis and Paddock, two generic 
drug makers filed ANDA applications for their generic versions of Androgel within the same 
year. Solvay chose to sue Actavis for patent infringement, but the FDA chose to approve its 
generic drug even though the dispute between two companies continued for three years. But 
after the approval, Actavis took another direction. Rather than bringing its generic drug to the 
market, the generic drug company entered into a reverse payment settlement  with the originator 
Solvay. Under the terms of the agreement, Actavis would keep its generic drug off the market 
for a specified number of years and also agree to promote Androgel to doctors. The Federal 
Trade Commission filed suit7, alleging that Actavis had unlawfully abandoned its patent chal-
lenge by agreeing to share in the "monopoly profits" of Solvay, and withdrawing its generic 
drug from the market. In FTC v. Actavis (2019) the Court claimed that the reverse payment 
settlement between the parties was subject to antitrust law because they were delaying the entry 
of the generic competitor. It’s incredible how many are the infringement cases in the pharma’s 
history regarding these pay-for-delay settlements.  
Chapter 3 focuses especially on three of them, trying to bring these strategies to the table and 
understand how they get performed and what is their impact to the industry.   
 
6 See Commission Decision of 15 January 2008 initiating an inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector pursuant to 
Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003, OJ 12008] C 59/0 




1.5.5. Establishment of generic units by innovator companies 
 
Over the past decade, Big Pharma has acquired small generic units to expand their business 
model. (Kumar & Nanda, 2017) In order to compete with the generic players, originator 
companies show an increasing interest in setting subsidiaries and entering partnerships with 
major generic companies and building in this way a position in generics before the end of the 
term of the parent patent and before the competition from rival generic players rise.  
For example, Novartis, the well-known Swiss pharmaceutical company, established Sandoz as 
a subsidiary unit for manufacturing generic drugs and thanks to this strategy saw its profits in 
generics rise up to US 7.5 billion dollars in 2009. The division was established in 2003, when 
Novartis united all of its generic’s businesses under the name Sandoz. This new Business Unit 
would have the aim to produce high-quality generics for both the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industry at competitive prices.  By having their generic version associated with 
their expertise in production and formulation, originators can choose to imply defensive pricing 
strategies. Once the drug goes off patent, innovator companies may respond to the generic 
competition by decreasing the price of their generic version or by introducing improved generic 
versions at a lower price that may leave generic competitors a generation behind. As long as 
this type of strategy delays or block generic entry, it is considered part of evergreening tactics. 
 
1.5.6. Combining two or more drug products 
The United States and the European Union have specific laws that provide supplementary 
patent protection in case of combination of drugs. Knowing that, innovators are launching a 
mixture of soon to go off-patent drugs with another drug to supply treatment for 2 closely 
associated medical conditions. This sort of combination may attain the identical position which 
the branded drugs attained during the exclusivity period and such follow-on products provide a 
troublesome competition to the generics. (Kumar & Nanda, 2017) Also huge amounts of cash 
is being pumped to the brand company to make sure that their product is prescribed over the 
older versions, regardless if the combined product lacks experimental evidence of enhanced 
efficacy and safety. Venlafaxine, an antidepressant medication was earlier marketed as Effexor 
and sold by Pfizer. The drug showed some important side-effects to patients. Pfizer reduced 
these side effects by suggesting that the drug was administered in extended release form. In 
spite of this fact, the combination of Venlafaxine and the extended release version of 
venlafaxine to overcome the side effects two separate patents were granted by the patent owner 
for the two versions of venlafaxine which in turn delayed entry of generics by two and a half 
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years. Clinical trials later showed that the combination was an obvious knowledge and no new 
innovation was brought in. The evergreening patents were later declared invalid. 
 
1.5.7. De-listing reference listed drug from the Orange Book (USA) 
 
As previously mentioned in the paragraph related to the US patent law,  every innovator drug 
that is patented gets entry into the Orange Book and before a generic gets approved it is 
necessary for the ANDA filler to prove that the generic version is comparable to the innovator 
drug. So basically the innovator drug serves as a reference for the launch of the new generic 
version. Delisting it from the Orange Book and “cancelling” in this way the possibility for the 
generic manufacturer to use the innovation as a reference is another evergreening tactic to 
significantly delay the entry of generics. A company that practiced this tactic in the 
pharmaceutical industry was Ferring which owned a patent for DDAVP tablets, containing 
active ingredient as desmopressin acetate, a medicinal for diabetes. Glenmark, a major Indian 
generic company was waiting for Ferring’s patent expiry in order to launch its generic version 
in the US market. 
In an effort to discourage Glenmark’s marketing of launching its generic version, Ferring 
applied to FDA for de-listing the patent from Orange book. In front of this fact, Glenmark 
petitioned against the de-listing (Glenmark Generics Ltd. v. Ferring B.V., 2014) claiming it was 
an unlawful practice with the aim of blocking generic versions of desmopressin acetate. The 











8 (Glenmark Generics Ltd. v. Ferring B.V., 2014) – See Table of Cases for Ref. number 
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                                                   II. 





For more than a year now, pharma companies are in the midst of an unprecedented change. 
While this was true even before COVID-19, the pandemic and the ensuing economic downturn 
have brought major challenges in the way organizations look at the road ahead. This pandemic 
has spurred the adoption of technologies and other innovations to support new solutions. While 
creating opportunities for the biopharma industry to demonstrate the industry’s value, it also 
has led to potential short- and long-term challenges. Global market growth, strengthening R&D, 
and transformation of digital and IT are currently the top strategic priorities for biopharma com-
panies, and will continue to be so in the future. This chapter keeps however its focus on the 
evergreening strategies and the secondary patenting, in order to identify their economic and 
social impact.  
This impact is definitely influenced by the market size and also the operating model of the 
pharmaceutical companies. Big pharma companies’ business model in the last decades has tran-
sitioned from the one-size-fit-all medicine to a specialty one. This evolution has been dictated 
by various trends and operational challenges that big pharma had to face. To get a clearer full 
picture of the dimensions of this market, as one of the most significant ones in terms of invest-
ments and innovation, we look through data, latest trends, and the future perspective of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Between these numbers, unfortunately, it is difficult to measure the 
impact of evergreening practices due to the complicated nature of these strategies. Literature 
itself tries to highlight and measure somehow the economic and social impact that these prac-
tices have. 
Regulators, especially those in the main markets such as USA and EU, acknowledge these ef-
fects and have introduced provisions on trying to limit the expansion of the evergreening tactics 
on the pharmaceutical market. But these provisions seem uncomplete and not well specified. 
Are these the actual regulatory loopholes that consent pharma undertakings to exploit ever-
greening? 




2.2. Big Pharma’s business model  
 
The pharmaceutical industry has always been a prisoner of its past successes. While the busi-
ness environment has been changing drastically in the past years, the pharma companies’ busi-
ness model took a long time to upgrade.  
Traditionally, most big pharma’s undertakings have done everything by themselves, from Re-
search and Development (R&D) to marketing and commercialization of their products follow-
ing a “profit alone” path. The historic model was that of a large diversified company with large 
R&D footprints in multiple global hubs around developed countries and primary care busi-
nesses driving a huge portion of revenues. Only a minimal contribution was coming from the 
emerging economies. Referring to the mid-90s and the early 2000s period, there was a push for 
the “bigger is better” model. In fact, the biggest merger and acquisitions operations were reg-
istered at that time, starting with Astra and Zeneca merger, Pfizer and Warner-Lambert, Glaxo 
and SmithKline, Sanofi and Aventis, culminating in 2003 with the Pfizer-Pharmacia merger.    
(Gautam & Pan, 2016) This wave of mega acquisitions was largely triggered by the declining 
R&D productivity and pharmaceutical firms were using the economies of scale as one justifi-
cation for integrating the dispersed research units around the merged companies. Scale would 
help companies to diversify the risk of uncertain investments in R&D. Big Pharma believed 
that it would boost their power to launch new products, expand their in-licensing capacity and 
would help them exploit next generation technologies.  
The 1995-2005 period is known also as the blockbusters’ drugs era for big pharma. In fact, the 
largest mergers in the industry were primarily driven by single blockbusters9 which were at the 
basis of how pharma companies measured their productivity and profitability. This because of 
the huge returns that these blockbusters would bring in. An average drug is expected to deliver 
only 5% return on investment (ROI), while a successful blockbuster can bring up to 10 - 20 
times as large returns. The majority of a company’s investment was on creating these block-
buster products. At the time, the biggest selling drugs in the industry were primary care therapy 
drugs and accounted for roughly 80% of revenues for most big pharma portfolios. The leading 
major markets were North America and Europe and none of the big pharma companies had 
more than 20% of revenues deriving from the emerging markets. 
Soon things started to change as the pharmaceutical industry was facing new challenges in an 
always intensive and competitive environment. 
 
 




Table 2 - The Transition from Massive-to-Lean strategy 
 
 
 Source: Gautam & Pan (2016) 
 
The blockbuster model, considered the most successful one, started to show major failures. 
Further declining R&D productivity, rising costs of commercialization and shorter exclusivity 
periods had driven up the average cost per successful launch up to $1.7 billion and reduced 
average expected returns on new investments to the unsustainable level of only 5%.  Several 
studies have reviewed the industry’s declining productivity challenges, the transitioning of 
commercial models and the growth of emerging markets as key revenue contributors created a 
natural environment to lead to the creation of a fundamentally new business model. And in fact, 
and as seen in Table 2, recent years have seen a significant change in the operating model of 
the pharmaceutical companies. The current big pharma model is transitioning to that of a lean, 
focused company with a research footprint within innovation bioclusters and a growing revenue 
32 
 
stream from specialty products, biologics, and emerging markets. (Gautam & Pan, 2016) In an 
interview for "The Guardian" in 2008, J.P. Garnier, former chief executive of GlaxoSmithKline 
pointed out the specificity of pharma business claiming it as a “business model where you are 
guaranteed to lose your entire book of business every 10 to 12 years.”  
Gautam & Pan (2016) in their article “The changing model of big pharma: impact on key trends” 
analysed data in order to understand the changes and any trends over the past two decades. 
Their data review revealed 4 main trends that big pharma’s operating model was going through:  
from massive to lean; from hubs to hotspots; from West to East and from primary to specialty.  
Starting from the late 2000s, pharmaceutical companies began to embrace a leaner and focused 
model by divesting non-core assets and focusing on their areas of strength. For example, GSK 
and Novartis divided their businesses to create focused organizations with GSK increasing the 
focus on consumer health and vaccines and Novartis on oncology. This period witnessed still 
big acquisitions but this time they were largely driven by strategic rationale and to build com-
plementary capabilities rather than a desire to be ‘massive’. The earlier wave of mega-acquisi-
tions built mega hubs all around the globe that were used as research units for high-throughput 
technologies that later on started to create self-contained silos. So, there was the need for a shift 
from these big hubs to bioscience hotspots - the innovation clusters such as Boston, San Fran-
cisco, San Diego, Cambridge, London, Shanghai - which are the key centres for producing 
breakthrough science. 
With the coming of closer patent expiry of products in the USA, Canada and the EU pharma-
ceutical firms as AstraZeneca, Pfizer, GSK etc., got convinced to grow their portfolios to com-
prise at least 25% of the total revenues from the emerging countries. There was an immense 
shift towards the Eastern countries during the last decade with growth of their largely primary 
care business in these countries. Not just commercially, the emerging countries, especially India 
and China, have also seen an increase in innovation capabilities. With the support of significant 
government and private capital, a growing talent pool of experienced Western-trained returnees 
and an evolving life science ecosystem, these countries are progressing as hotspots for global 
innovation. In China for example, most big pharma companies have already established their 
research units in Shanghai. 
On the other side, the growing understanding of the disease’s biology, the technology innova-
tion for biologics and the favourable regulatory frameworks for such medicines shifted big 
pharma away from developing primary care and small-molecule medicines towards specialty 
medicines and biologics for high unmet medical needs, over the past decade. In 2014 for exam-
ple, primary care medicines only accounted for approximately one-quarter of new FDA-ap-
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proved new molecular entities (NMEs) according to the consulting firm PWC’s Health Re-
search Institute study. All these changes have definitely contributed to a more efficient business 
model for the pharmaceutical firms. But still, this upgraded business model cannot save the 
industry from facing significant challenges such as the continued patent expiration, the R&D 
productivity, pricing and reimbursement, regulatory barriers etc. Some of these challenges are 
linked to the emerging countries where therapies continue to be expensive and new pricing and 
reimbursement strategies are needed to make them more affordable for patients. On the other 
hand, positive steps have been made on the convergence of IT and healthcare. With new players 
such as Apple and Google, big data and mobile health are starting to transform healthcare and 
diagnostics in a significant way. Big pharma is adapting to the ‘beyond-the pill’ model with 
medicines accompanied with apps and wearable devices to help patients monitor key parame-
ters. The increasing investments, the growth of technology start-ups, and the expiry of several 
key patents, as well as increasing inter-organizational collaborations and a favourable regula-
tory environment, are definitely spurring innovation across the pharma industry trends. 
 
2.2. Going through the numbers 
 
All the trends that affected the development of the pharmaceutical companies’ business model 
have been canalized not only into bringing new medicines that can improve health and quality 
of life for patients but also in the growing profits. In fact, the research-based pharmaceutical 
industry is one of the most important key assets of the global economy. 
 
Figure 3 - The pharmaceuticals' growth (2016 – 2024) 
 
Source: Data provided from Pharmaceuticals Global Market Report 2021 
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If we look at the forecasts10 of the Pharmaceuticals Global Market Report 2021 of the Business 
Research Company the market has been growing from $1228.45 billion in 2020 to $1250.24 
billion in 2021 at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 1.8% and is expected to expand 
at a CAGR of 3-6% to $1.5-1.6 Trillion by 2024. The market is expected to reach $1.7 Trillion 
in 2025 at a CAGR of 8%.  
The growth is mainly based on the returns on investment from R&D. Pharma companies have 
been rearranging their operations in two different directions: chasing the volume growth in 
emerging markets - known as pharmerging markets - on one hand, and launching high-end 
specialty innovative products in the developed markets on the other hand. Their key Research 
& Development focus is immunology, oncology, biologics and cell and gene therapies. Global 
R&D spend is estimated to grow at a CAGR of 3% by 2024, lower than that of 4.2% between 
2010 and 2018, partially driven by companies’ focus on smaller indications, with lower clinical 
development costs. These smaller indications, known as specialty medicines, help on treating 
chronic, rare and complex diseases and have already made significant difference in patient out-
comes. Their growing demand has been a steady growth driver in global pharmaceutical spend-
ing during the last decade, mostly in the developed markets11. 
They are likely to account for 40% of global pharmaceutical spending by 2024, with the fastest 
growth expected to be in the developed markets, where contribution of specialty products is 
likely to cross 50% by 2024. According to Pharmaceuticals Global Market Report 2021, the 
pharma spending in these markets grew at ~4% CAGR between 2014-19 and is estimated to 
grow at about 2-5% CAGR to reach US$985-1015 Billion by 2024. The developed markets 
accounted for ~66% of global pharmaceutical spending in 2019, with North America itself ac-
counting for around 45% of it. 
The uptake of specialty products is slower in pharmerging markets due to absence of or inade-
quate prescription insurance coverage for the masses. Some latest generation innovative medi-
cines are likely to be launched in these markets, but given the high price of such products, the 
uptake may be limited. Instead, growth in pharmerging markets is still powered by higher vol-
umes for branded and pure generic medicines with increasing access among the population. 
Pharmerging markets are likely to continue registering faster growth than developed markets, 
with a 5-8% CAGR through 2024, lower than the 7% CAGR recorded during 2014-19.  
 
10 The data and analysis throughout the report is sourced using end notes. The report covers market 
characteristics, size and growth, segmentation, regional and country breakdowns, competitive landscape, market 
shares, trends and strategies for this market. 
11 The prices of specialty medicines are very high so the majority of these products’ uptake is likely to be in 
markets with robust reimbursement systems. 
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The second largest region accounting for 26% of the global pharmaceuticals market is Asia 
Pacific followed by Africa as the smallest region. Tab.3 reflects a summary of all the main 
regional trends starting from Y2019 with forecasts for Y2024. 
 
Table 3: Regional Data Summary 
Region/Country  2019 (in US$ bn) 2014-2019 CAGR 2024 (in US$ bn) 2019-2024 CAGR 
USA 510 4,30% 605-635 3-6% 
WE5 174 4,00% 210-240 3-6% 
Germany 52 4,90% 65-75 4-7% 
France 35 1,60% 38-42 0-3% 
Italy 34 5,10% 41-45 3-6% 
UK 29 4,50% 37-41 4-7% 
Spain 25 4,00% 30-34 3-6% 
Japan 87 -0,20% 88-98 (-3)-0% 
Canada 23 4,60% 26-30 4-7% 
South Korea 16 7,30% 21-25 5-8% 
Australia 12 3,50% 13-17 3-6% 
Developed markets 823 3,80% 985-1015 2-5% 
  Pharmerging 358 7,00% 475-505 5-8% 
Other 71 4,80% 85-95 2-5% 
Global 1250 4,70% 1570-1600 3-6% 
Source: Data provided from Pharmaceuticals Global Market Report 2021 
 
With oncology as the main R&D focus area in the biopharma industry, the prescription drug 
sales are expected to grow at the forecast annual CAGR of 6.9% by 2024. While for the 
Consumer health products that do not require prescription from healthcare professionals and 
can be purchased Over-the-Counter (OTC) from a pharmacy store, the market is projected to 
grow at 4.3% CAGR by 2024. Today’s informed patients believe in taking better healthcare 
decisions and are engaging in effective health management through digital tools.  
In terms of players, the pharmaceutical industry is still dominated by the traditional players 
ones. The Worldwide Prescription Drug Sales number one spot in 2024 is reserved to Pfizer 
which has once again pushed ahead of Novartis and Roche. Novartis jumps to the number two 
spot after exhibiting 2.3% CAGR between 2018-24 as opposed to Roche’s 0.8% CAGR. 
AstraZeneca has also shown impressive 7.7% CAGR, due to breakthroughs in the Chinese 
market and high sales of its oncology products.  
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When focusing instead on the most innovative pharma companies and value creation, the tenth 
annual Pharmaceutical Innovation Index12 by IDEA Pharma, sees Eli Lilly at the top the of 
industry for the first time. The pharmaceutical company’s raise can be attributed to multiple 
clinical data wins, and notable novel FDA approvals, as well as strong performance of recently 
launched drugs.  
 
Table 4: Pharmaceutical Innovation Index 2021 
 
Source: IDEA Pharma 
The Index defines innovation as "return on invention", and measures the pharmaceutical com-
pany's ability to deliver innovation to patients, by objectively evaluating performance based on 
a rolling five-year period (2015-2020), and operates on the simple premise: if you gave the same 
molecule to two different companies in early phase, which would make the best of it?  
As can be seen by Tab.3, the top 10 Innovation includes new players – Seagen and Incyte - as 
well as a significant rise for Regeneron, suggesting that smaller companies are, more than ever, 
able to bring their products to patients without a traditional large pharma partner. (IDEA 
Pharma, 2021) According to the index, the success is achieved by developing meaningfully 
great medicines and supply them to patients. More than ever, in this industry, excellence is 




12 The Pharmaceutical Invention Index by IDEA Pharma introduces a ranking of the industry's best pipelines, 





2.2.1. The future of Pharma & IT 
 
As in all the other industries, pharma companies are also recovering from the COVID-19 impact, 
which had earlier led to restrictive containment measures involving social distancing and re-
mote working that resulted in operational challenges.  On the other, further challenges are raised 
due to the fact that the population profile of most countries is becoming older. According to the 
United Nations, the share of population over the age of 65 in the global population increased 
from 8% in 2015 to 9% in 2019 to around 703 million of people worldwide. The rise in the 
aging population has increased the patient pool of many chronic diseases such as rheumatoid 
arthritis, hypertension, diabetes, and cancer. This increased the demand for pharmaceuticals 
used in the treatment of these diseases, significantly impacting market growth. 
On the other hand, leveraging uninterrupted access to information, the consumer is wielding 
growing power, leading to creation of new market segments and new models of healthcare. 
Today’s informed patients believe in taking better healthcare decisions and are engaging in 
effective health management through digital tools.  
The continuous progress in artificial intelligence and machine learning will carry important 
implications within data science for optimisation of decision-making, ethical handling of pa-
tient privacy, and proper use and management of extensive data sets. The main source in gen-
erating important patient insights will be genomic data, as it helps the genetic basis of diseases 
and their treatment with targeted gene-based therapies. The use of artificial intelligence in col-
lecting accurate patient experiences, managing their historical records, and augmented, virtual, 
and mixed reality (AR, VR & MR) solutions is not a distant future anymore. On this day, quite 
a third of pharma start-ups are working on finding new software solutions and flexible pharma-
ceutical manufacturing to provide access to basic medicines in many areas of the world.   
Finally, digital technologies have played a big role in supporting the communication between 
patients and doctor during the COVID-19 period since a face-to-face consultation seems diffi-












2.3. Back to evergreening: Implications on innovation and price competition. 
 
The previous paragraphs aimed to display the dimensions of the pharma industry, as one of the 
biggest key assets in the global economy. Between those numbers, unfortunately, we could not 
identify the impact of evergreening practices due to the difficult nature of these strategies. 
A recent conducted study regarding the top twelve drugs by gross U.S. revenue found that 
pharmaceutical innovators granted on average up to seventy-one patents for every single one 
of them. This is a significant number considering that they revolve around the same active 
ingredient. The debate around the evergreening phenomena is a heated one because the reasons 
from both sides can be considered valid. Both parties, critics, and defenders of evergreening 
put pressure on their own arguments. On one side, critics believe that by obtaining secondary 
patents through evergreening, pharmaceutical undertakings unfairly shield a pharmaceutical 
product from generic or biosimilar competition, thereby resulting in higher prices. And in view 
of evergreening critics, more of these secondary patents are of questionable validity. Also, the 
cost of litigation which is around $1.8 million doesn't help in challenging these patents. Thus, 
when a product is protected by comparably weak patents, critics argue that the cost of 
invalidating those patents strengthen the branded products' position in the market and can 
lengthen its effective period of exclusivity. Defenders on the other hand respond that the term 
‘evergreening’ is a term ‘inherently pejorative’ because it creates the impression that 
pharmaceutical companies are exploiting the patent system. They say that there is nothing 
suspect for the secondary patents which just any other patent must meet the same requirements 
for patentability and pass through the same examination procedures of any other patent. 
According to them, the value of a follow-on patent is comparable to or even might exceed that 
of a primary patent. Defenders also argue that the ability to receive a patent on a later-
development formulation provides a significant incentive to address problems with the original 
formulation. The original formulation of Lumigan for example, which is used to treat glaucoma, 
resulted with strong side effects that lead patients to stop the use. Researchers subsequently 
developed an improved formulation with significant decreased risk of side effects. Without the 
possibility of patent protection, defenders say that it would have been impossible to perform 
this sort of research due to the significant costs involved.  
Moreover, pharma manufacturers themselves argue that the secondary patents will obviously 
be narrower than the primary patents because they are actually improvements to these primary 
patents. Doctors and patients can then decide whether the benefit conferred by a product cov-
ered by a secondary patent is worth the increased cost over the generic versions of the product 
formerly covered by the primary patent. 
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Secondary patents are also defended on the grounds of being necessary to recoup development 
costs. As mentioned before, even though the patent term is generally 20 years, the effective 
market exclusivity is shorter than that, 12-13 years on average. 
For the cost of litigation that critics bring up front, defenders on the other side say that the recent 
congressional action has decreased the cost of challenging patents, decreasing the impact of 
these later-filed ‘evergreening’ patents. The median cost for litigation and IPR to the final de-
cision is $324.000. Thus, IPR provides a relatively fast and relatively inexpensive method to 
challenge issued patents, particularly when compared to litigation in the courts.  The direct fi-
nancial impact of the evergreening practices unfortunately cannot be identified in the numbers 
presented in the previous paragraph for the pharmaceutical market. Studies have tried to meas-
ure instead the effects on the innovation level of the industry of these practices, the effects on 
the price competition and on the social welfare. 
In chapter 1, we introduced the debate on the effects of patents on innovation, independently of 
the theoretical deadweight loss associated with the monopoly position. As a consequence, it is 
indisputable that strategic patenting has its effects on the innovation level. While a patent grants 
a monopoly right to recoup R&D costs, a secondary patent derived from an evergreening prac-
tice not only guarantees that but also is used to prevent other future originator competitors from 
inventing. The extension ends up limiting sequential or complementary innovation and does 
not grant much incentive to venture into new R&D while it ends up blocking rivals.  Thus, 
consumers are stuck with old high-priced drugs with no alternative to measure efficiency. 
The second aspect of evergreening that is of interest in competition policy is its price effect. 
From the theory of the imperfect market structure, the originator company is naturally interested 
in influencing the market price above the marginal cost. And with the evergreening practices, 
by getting secondary patents this influence can get prolonged. In this way it delays the generic 
entry, which entrance has important effects on the falling of prices. To stress the price effect, it 
is important to consider how it affects public health, particularly the price of medical care. 
Although empirical results seem to be unclear about that, theoretically, the monopoly price 
reflects in the form of a high medical cost. And the effect of the increased medical costs is 
important in both developed and the emerging countries. In the developed economies, it reflects 
in the form of increased cost of social security. For developing countries instead with problem-
atic medical insurance, these expensive drugs are considered as a form of social exclusion and 
may negatively correlate with life expectancy. Strategic patenting ends up imposing a huge 





2.4. A literature review on pharma evergreening 
 
Even though providing data that measures the financial effects of evergreening in pharmaceu-
ticals in terms of social welfare or increased profit margins for the big pharma is very difficult, 
many have been the authors that study these tactics in the industry. For this thesis, we made a 
literature review that identified 20 publications, which included 18 papers and 2 reports from 
FTC and EC. The oldest one is from 2005. The literature research was based in Google Scholar 
and Scopus Library. The used keywords were specifically ‘evergreening’ ‘evergreening in 
pharmaceuticals’ evergreening in the pharma industry’ ‘secondary patenting’. These syno-
nyms emerged subsequently after reading papers. 
By far the most cited paper is by Hemphill & Sampat (2012) with a total of 227 citations and 
an average of 25 annual citations. The article appeared in health-related economic journal, Jour-
nal Health of Economics. 
Bansal, et al. (2009), Dwivedi et al.(2010), Thomas (2009) and Wyllie (2005) were mostly 
concerned in the definition of the evergreening practices in pharmaceuticals from the point of 
view of originators. These papers were published in cross-disciplinary journals related to legal, 
and  medical contents. Very few of them appeared in mere business-related journals. We can 
cite Jain and Conley (2012) as one of the few ones with managerial focus on IP. 
 In contrast, there were less papers and studies available regarding evergreening strategies by 
generics. For the purpose of this thesis we identified specifically the analysis of Gaudry (2011) 
and Higgins and Graham (2009) which are against too much possibilities given to generic drug 
makers to enter the market. The authors report the Paragraph IV of US patent law that allows 
firms to bring generics to the market, even before the originator has its parent patent expired.  
Another publication by the Federal Trade Commission (2002) is included in this literature re-
view as it examines whether the 180-day exclusivity incentivised by the Hatch-Waxman Act is 
susceptible to delay access to generic alternatives to branded drug products. 
As for critics and defenders of these practices in the industry, we identified two crucial papers 
from Vines & Faunce (2011) and Leitzan (2020) who claimed the need of breaking the ever-
greening myth as a strategy with negative impact. While studies criticising these tactic were 
more frequent. Most articles are concerned on how the national policy level allows space for 
these strategies which have a negative impact on costs for health insurance system of a specific 
country. Specifically for the US, Hemphill and Sampat (2012), Darrow (2010), Newsome 
(2017), Beall et al. (2017) were some of the most cited papers on such matter. Addressing the 
EU, we identified one report by the European Commission addressing the situation in EU as a 
whole (EC, 2008). While, moving on in India, as a country which attracted interest of this work, 
we found Kumar et al. (2009), Bansal (2009), Nair (2008) addressing the general situation while 
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the paper by Rathod (2010) offers a comparative analysis of the evergreening practices across 
two or more countries:  in this case among Canada, India, Australia, Philippines and Thailand. 
Chalmers (2006) examines evergreening behaviour in the US - Australia Free Trade Agreement. 
Even though evergreening behaviours are fully studied by academic literature, very little quan-
titative  data is available with patent statistics. The analysis remain mostly descriptive. 
 
2.5. Provisions in USA and Europe to prevent Evergreening 
 
Evergreening is influenced by three fields of regulation: the pharmaceutical regulatory law, 
patent law and competition law. Finding an equilibrium between them is difficult since they 
pursuit different policy objectives. A heated debate in aligning the intellectual property law and 
competition law in the context of pharmaceutical patent is still open. This complicated  
relationship can lead to difficulties in identifying and applying the competition rules in case of 
evergreening. 
2.5.1. EU provisions against evergreening 
 
In the European Union the patent laws are still too lenient and there are not much laws 
concerning ever-greening. 
When a dominant position has been established, the analysis turns to the assessment of whether 
that position has been abused. How can we distinguish legitimate from illegitimate behaviour? 
A risk associated with applying Article 102 too aggressively, and especially in relation to 
exclusionary conduct, is that competition is chilled rather than encouraged. Such a result would 
obviously be counterproductive: a law designed to promote competition should not have the 
effect of diminishing it. Article 102 (b) states that conduct consisting of “limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers” is an abuse. This is the more 
traditional sort of exclusionary abuse. But more subtle, non-price strategies aimed at excluding 
competitors may also be abusive, e.g. patent litigation, use and abuse of regulatory procedures 
and launch of second-generation products. Lately, new forms of abuse have been identified 
under Article 102. One of them is evergreening. Even though a notable amount of doctrine has 
been published on the concept of abuse of dominant position, the meaning and scope of Article 
102 in relation to evergreening is uncertain. 
The consideration of evergreening under Article 102 is still uncertain as it lacks clarity between 
the lawful and unlawful abuse of the abuse of the dominant position in relation to evergreening 
as patent laws being specific to a country therefore a community law such as the Article 102 
cannot challenge a country’s patent law, this is major allegation made by those convicted of the 
abuse of the dominant position. Moreover, a patent is an exclusive right granted to the patentee 
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and the patentee has the right to exploit the patent for monopoly, so this does not necessarily 
count as the abuse of dominant position. Evergreening seems to be forced fit into the scope of 
Article 102, so this article needs a narrow and clear definition to fit evergreening since the 
present definition is too broad and the exploitation of the provision seems inevitable. 
Another aspect of the application of Article 102 to evergreening is that pharmaceutical product 
markets have been narrowly defined, for example in AstraZeneca, making it easier to become 
dominant. Classical abuses take place on the market. On the contrary, evergreening does not. 
Instead, evergreening usually takes place in a regulatory context which has an effect on the 
market. As been described, the effect of evergreening may be to exclude or delay generic 
competition (an exclusionary abuse) but instead of creating economic barriers to market entry, 
as most of the classical abuses do, evergreening creates legal barriers. Thus, the exclusion of 
competitors is not a result of a pricing policy or any other exclusive practice, but merely the use 
of regulatory framework. Still, the effect of the conduct will take place on the market, just as 
the classical abuses. This should not cause any problem when applying Article 102 to 
evergreening. Article 102 prohibits any conduct that has an effect on the market. It is settled 
case law that the abusive conduct can take place in market different from the one where the 
effects are caused. It follows that the conduct can take place outside the market but still be 
abusive, as long as the conduct has effects on the market. 
 
2.5.2. USA regulations against evergreening 
 
In USA, the Hatch-Waxman Act (Patent Term Restoration Act) of 1984 was enacted to create 
a balance between the generic and the brand drug industry through certain provisions useful for 
both the generic manufacturer and the innovator companies. The underlying fact behind the 
scheme is that if the innovator drug is already approved then, to obtain market authorization 
and to launch its generic version, a generic company is required to demonstrate an identical 
biological effect rather than repeating clinical trials all over again. To balance the interests of 
the innovator companies the act requires generic applicant to choose one of the four 
certifications in relation to the patent status of the competing generic drug: 
 
• Paragraph I: Drug is not patented 
• Paragraph II: Drug patent has expired 
• Paragraph III: Patent will expire by the time the generics drug hits the market 




The Hatch - Waxman Act in this work will be at the basis of our analysis regarding evergreening. 
Through this Act, a new procedure was introduced under which an ANDA application can be 
filed by the generic drug manufacturer to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) looking 
for marketing authorisations for the generic’s versions. ANDAs are eligible for two types of 
exclusivity periods: 180-day 'patent challenge' exclusivity and 180-day competitive generic 
therapy exclusivity. On the one hand, 180-day patent challenge exclusivity provides ANDA 
applicants with an incentive to challenge a listed drug's patents by providing 180 days of 
exclusivity to the first applicant that submits a substantially complete application containing a 
'Paragraph IV' certification to the listed drug's patent or patents. (Kracov, et al., 2020)  During 
the exclusivity period, which starts on the date of the first commercial marketing of the ANDA, 
the FDA may not approve an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification that references the 
same listed drug.   
The filing of an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification with regard to a patent is sometimes 
referred to as an 'artificial' act of infringement because the generic company has not yet sold a 
product covered by any of the Orange Book-listed patents. (Kracov, et al., 2020) Within 20 
days of the FDA's acceptance of an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification, the ANDA 
applicant is required to provide written notice to the NDA owner and each owner of the chal-
lenged patents that the ANDA has been filed along with the ANDA filer's detailed basis for its 
opinion that any of the listed patents are invalid or will not be infringed. (Kracov, et al., 2020) 
If the NDA owner files an infringement action within 45 days of the receipt of a Paragraph IV 
notice, FDA approval of the generic application is stayed for a period of 30 months while the 
patent dispute is litigated. For new drugs that have NCE exclusivity (explained in Section III), 
the stay of FDA approval extends until seven and a half years after NDA approval. A court may 
order that this period be shorter or longer 'because either party to the action failed to reasonably 
cooperate in expediting the action'. (Kracov, et al., 2020) 
The 30-month stay of generic approval provides time for the NDA owner and ANDA filer to 
litigate patent issues prior to final FDA approval of the ANDA and therefore prior to sales of 
the generic drug. If an Orange Book-listed patent is held valid and infringed, the district court 
will order that the effective date of generic approval will be not be earlier than the expiration 
date of the patent. The district court can also grant injunctive relief to prevent the commercial 
manufacture, use, offer to sell or sale within the United States, or importation into the United 
States of the infringing product and can also award monetary damages if there has been a com-
mercial sale of the generic product. No statute currently specifically forbids evergreening. In-
stead, substantive patent law, particularly the law of obviousness, provides limits on whether 
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the PTO may grant later-filed patents. Specifically, a patent may not be granted if the differ-
ences between the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a 
whole would have been obvious before the patent application was filed. The Supreme Court 
has not articulated a specific test for whether an invention would have been obvious, instead 
preferring a flexible approach that takes the facts and circumstances of the state of the art into 
account.  The Court has identified, however, some situations in which an invention likely would 
have been obvious. For example, if the invention involves “the simple substitution of one 
known element for another or the mere application of a known technique to a piece of prior art 
ready for the improvement,” the invention likely would have been obvious. At bottom, if the 
invention is “a predictable variation” of what came before, then the law of obviousness “likely 
bars its patentability.”  Other doctrines also affect the viability of later-filed patents. Because 
the patent statute limits a person to “a patent” for a new invention, a single patentee may not 
obtain a later patent that covers the exact same invention as an earlier patent. This doctrine is 
referred to as “statutory double patenting” because it derives from the patent statute and pre-
vents patenting of the same invention twice by the same inventor. The courts have extended 
double patenting to bar an inventor from patenting obvious variations of his earlier patents as 
well. This second form of double patenting, referred to as “obviousness-type double patenting,” 
prohibits a later patent that is not “patentability distinct” from an earlier commonly owned pa-
tent. In other words, the doctrine bars a patent owner from receiving a patent on an obvious 












                                           III.  




India has been for long a pioneer in the developing world for attempting to adapt its 
pharmaceutical patent law to take account of domestic health needs and to be in line with its 
level of development. This country provided an example in patent law also for other developing 
economies such as Argentina and Brazil. With its established export-oriented pharmaceutical 
industry complemented by civil society awareness, India has been at the centre of global access 
to medicines and at the centre of this chapter and this thesis.  
The country known for its high reverse engineering on drugs and the advantages of lower capital 
expenditures has been able to be powerfully present into the global generic markets. The TRIPS 
Agreement established certain minimum standards that must be adhered to by each member 
nation in order to protect and enforce Intellectual Property Rights. The Agreement per se 
doesn’t specify the patentability criteria for the countries, just some basic standards, leaving 
space to the country member to define “inventions” for the purposes of the patent law. TRIPS 
has granted certain flexibilities to the member nations in framing their Patent Laws considering 
their social and economic needs. (Shalini & Rekha, 2016) By signing the TRIPS, India 
introduced product patents for pharmaceuticals in 1995. For protecting its public health, in 2005 
India also introduced a special provision, Section 3(d). Under this new provision, new forms of 
already known substances were not granted a patent unless they are proved to have enhanced 
the known efficacy of that already known substance. The country declared “war” to 
evergreening practices and through the years many patent applications were denied by the 
Indian Patent Office claiming that no enhanced efficacy had been presented. This chapter 
analyses 3 of them, which have been at the centre of global attention, especially in the US, 
where the impact of Indian pharma is huge.  
The decisions of the Indian authorities regarding these cases had broader implications and still 
today the Section 3(d) presents significant hurdles to Western pharmaceutical companies trying 
to market their products in this country. Many have been claiming that the ruling of the Indian 
Patent law is not compliant with TRIPS or even that it shows signs of discrimination towards 
the western drug manufacturers. While on the other hand, it’s interesting to monitor the strategic 
moves of the Indian drug manufacturers of generics in the US market. 
 
Keywords: TRIPS, Section 3(d), Indian Patent Law, Gleevec, patentability criteria. 
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3.2. India against evergreening on pharmaceuticals 
 
India was the first country that raised the voice that many of the multinational drug companies 
were abusing their market monopoly in the face of a catastrophic human disaster. The anti-
retroviral revolution that was able to help millions of AIDS patients across the world was 
possible only thanks to India. Cheap production from India enabled HIV medicines to reach 
millions of people in the developing countries, reducing the price from $10,000 a year, to only 
$350 a year. The country currently has significant expertise in process chemistry, reverse 
engineering, designing, enjoys the advantages of lower capital expenditures, plant operating 
expenses, costs of innovation which enabled it to foray into the global generic markets. 
Prior to the TRIPS Agreement, patent laws varied across countries, and in many, including 
India, patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs was not permitted. Largely in response to the 
India-initiated public health-oriented patent law reform, the multinational pharmaceutical 
industry set in train efforts to form a global patent law. Subsequently, the TRIPS Agreement 
established certain minimum standards that must be adhered to by each member nation. Upon 
joining the WTO, each country must ratify a number of Agreements, including the TRIPS 
Agreement which establishes minimum standards for protecting and enforcing intellectual 
property rights for all WTO member countries. Among these basic standards are that patents 
must be available for inventions that are “new”, involve “an inventive step” and are “capable 
of industrial application.” Additionally, patents must exist for twenty years and must confer the 
exclusive right to prevent others from making, using, or selling the claimed invention. 
India introduced product patents for pharmaceuticals in 1995 by signing the TRIPS agreement 
and as a part of its TRIPS and WTO and commitments amended its Patent Act in three phases 
with the final deadline in 2005. A main characteristic of the TRIPS Agreement is the flexibility 
that the WTO members enjoy which allows them to define what is to be considered "invention" 
for the purpose of the patent law. Like most patent laws in the world, TRIPS don’t define what 
an invention is. The policy space left open to national laws to distinguish between inventions 
that are patentable or not. 
In 2005, India introduced new patentability standards which were further restricted by the 
inclusion of a unique provision, Section 3(d). Under this new provision, new forms of already 
known substances were not granted a patent unless they are proved to have enhanced the known 
efficacy of that already known substance. Along with bringing in product patents for 
pharmaceuticals, it also made legislative changes for the introduction of stricter patentability 
standards, introducing post-grant opposition while considerably remodelling the then existing 
pre-grant opposition, clarifying the system for using patented products within the patent term 
for generic approval and bringing in a structured compulsory license mechanism. 
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The statutory intent behind the introduction of Section 3(d) was to discourage the unethical 
practices of evergreening. It restricts the patentability of certain new forms of older substances 
unless they satisfy the requirement of enhanced efficacy criteria.  
Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Act says:  
“The following inventions are NOT inventions within the meaning of this Act, - […] 
(d) the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result in the 
enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere discovery of any new property 
or new use of a known substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus 
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant.  
Explanation: For the purposes of this clause, salts, esters, ethers, polymorphs, metabolites, 
pure form, particle size, isomers, mixtures of isomers, complexes, combinations and other 
derivatives of known substance shall be considered to be the same.” 
Hence, Section 3(d) laid down higher patentability standards for new forms of already known 
substances and has proved as an effective provision in checking the unethical practices followed 
by innovators to extend the patent term. (Rathod, 2010) 
Denied on the grounds of not having met the standard of efficacy required by Section 3(d) of 
the 2005 Patent Act, on April 2013, the Supreme Court in India decided to dismiss Swiss drug 
maker Novartis AG’s attempt to win patent protection for its anti-cancer drug Gleevec. In doing 
so, the Supreme Court held that "incremental improvements or modifications to an existing 
drug are not patentable under India’s patent laws". (Brougher, 2013) This case attracted global 
attention on the broader implications including the question of patenting with net benefits to 
society and consideration of the specific conditions of a country. While the ruling may be a 
victory for Indian companies manufacturing cheap generics, it presented significant hurdles to 
Western pharmaceutical companies trying to market their products in this country. 
3.2. The major role in the American healthcare by Indian Pharma 
 
While trying to redefine and redesign its patent laws, India has been attracting strict opposition 
from the United States. In fact, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has regularly 
cited Section 3(d) as the reason of listing India as one of the countries whose intellectual 
property rights regimes are of ‘concern’ to the US. For that, the US FDA opened in 2008 its 
two overseas offices in New Delhi and Mumbai in order to monitor the product approvals to 
generic companies in India. The United States is the largest pharma market in the world with 
current generic sales accounting for 127.8 billion $, and India is its largest supplier. In terms of 
regional trends, Indian companies continued to dominate the market of final generics approvals, 
followed by US, EU and then China.  
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To better explain the high concern of USA in front of the Indian patent Law is important to 
understand the strategic penetration of Indian pharmaceutical industry in the US generic 
market.13 
For the purpose of this work, a descriptive and comprehensive study of product registration 
pattern of Indian pharmaceutical companies in the US was made. We analysed the ANDA 
approvals of Indian companies by US FDA based on the Orange Book and also Drug@FDA 
database, updated on December 2020. The collected information included human drug products 
along with their dosage forms, strengths, marketing status etc. approved in US pharmaceutical 
market during the 2010-2020 decade. The study considered all the Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications (ANDA) for all human products approved by the Centre for Drug Evaluation and 
Research (CDER) and from them identified those which came from Indian companies. 
 
Table 5: ANDA approvals and Indian companies' shares (2010-2020)14 
Source: Research based on US FDA Orange Book and Drug@FDA 
The US FDA approved a total of 6522 ANDAs during the last decade, 2010-2020 and 
specifically Indian companies received 2970 ANDA approvals, grabbing in this way over 36% 
of the approvals. The research methodology does also consider the foreign subsidiaries of 
Indian multinational companies. 
 
13 According to US FDA: a generic drug product is one that is comparable to an innovator drug product in 
dosage form, strength, route of administration, quality, performance characteristics, and intended use. 









Number of Indian companies Tentative approvals 
2020 754 297 28% 61 195 
2019 837 336 40% 76 165 
2018 813 290 36% 77 194 
2017 846 304 36% 61 171 
2016 598 201 34% 70 156 
2015 564 167 30% 48 147 
2014 385 130 34% 32 100 
2013 400 154 39% 38 86 
2012 476 178 37% 42 94 
2011 431 144 33% 49 117 
2010 418 142 34% 49 121 





Figure 4: Number of approved applications from India (2010-2020) 
 
Source: Research based on US FDA Orange Book and Drug@FDA 
 
Focusing on the last two years, it is easy to notice that the Indian presence is still strong in the 
US generic market, even though the effects of COVID-19 in the whole global economy. We’ve 
seen that India has been aggressively filing ANDAs over the past 10 years. 
In 2019, Indian pharma companies secured 336 ANDA approvals comparing to 290 in the 
previous year. The US FDA approved 837 ANDAs in 2019, and from them around 40% were 
from Indian companies. Similarly, total tentative approvals15 were at 165 in 2019 as against 194 
in 2018, guaranteeing this way 49% of total tentative approvals. 
Considering the huge size of US pharma market and the high expected earnings, several players 
try to strengthen their product pipeline by increasing their spending on R&D. Every player 
constantly works for launching new products after loss of marketing exclusivity. (Pingle, 2020) 
India’s major pharma players like Sun Pharma, Cadila Healthcare & Zydus Pharma, Aurobindo 
Pharma, Lupin, Alembic Pharma and Alkem Laboratories received over 20 ANDAs approvals 
during 2019. (Pingle, 2020) The Indian companies were well set to continue the ANDA filing 
trend in 2020 also with the help of R&D investment. But with the pandemic hit, the effects were 
visible. In 2020 the FDA approved less new generic drugs with respect to the previous years.   
Of 754 ANDAs, 28% of them were from Indian companies’ generics. The Authority also ten-
tatively approved an additional 195 ANDAs.  The dip in approvals comes after FDA increased 
its focus on generic drug approvals as part of the drug competition action plan championed by 
 
15 Tentative approvals occur when a drug has been found to be generic but is prohibited from 
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former FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb. The influence of the COVID-19 pandemic in FDA’s 
performance to approve generic drugs is unclear due to restrictions in conducting facility in-
spections and shifting resources to respond to the pandemic. (Mezher, 2020) Finally, from the 
study of FDA databases, it resulted that Indian companies have received the highest number of 
ANDA and tentative approvals during the last decade, granting an average share of 35% and 
leaving behind US pharma manufacturers and the European ones. 
 
3.4. To patent or not to patent in India? 
 
As already introduced, in the Indian Patent Law there are certain inventions which are deemed 
specifically under Section 3(d) which is known as the provision against evergreening.  
Under Section 3(d) of the Act an invention that claims an already known substance and an 
already known medicinal activity, shouldn’t be eligible for granting patentability unless it 
proves significant improvements of therapeutic efficacy considering the previously known 
compound. This provision has created various disputes with some of the big pharma. Table X 
presents some of them regarding pharmaceutical undertakings. These disputes have ended with 
the refusal of the patent grant under the Section 3(d) of Indian Patent Law. According to the 
Supreme Court of India, no significant difference with regard to therapeutic efficacy has been 
proven by the Applicants so they weren’t eligible for granting patentability. 
The Indian patent law allows pre-grant as well as post grant opposition. In most of the case we 
can see on the Table 6,  various patents have been challenged by the Indian manufacturers 
through the years. Three of them caught our particular interest as study cases regarding 
evergreening in pharmaceuticals. All three of them have had an opponent on the other side: an 
Indian pharma company claiming that the specific drug presented by the Applicants didn’t 













Table 6: Representative landmark cases of Section 3(d) rejections/oppositions 
 

























3.4.1. Novartis AG v. Union of India - A Case Perspective16. 
 
Novartis International AG [hereafter Novartis], the giant pharmaceutical company, filed during 
the ’90 different patent applications in the US, for a drug containing “imatinib”. After granting 
this patent, Novartis then filed another patent application for the “beta crystalline” form of the 
imatinib mesylate salt. The US Food and Drug Administration approved the active ingredient 
imatinib mesylate for use against cancer and treating chronic myeloid leukaemia, in the form 
of Novartis marketed drug “Gleevec”. Gleevec was Novartis' top-selling oncology drug in 2015 
with sales of $4.66 billion. Through the years, several patents were obtained for the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate by Novartis in other countries. Novartis claimed that the 
company had filed patent applications for its beta crystalline form in more than 50 countries 
and had successfully obtained patents in 35 of them.   
But this was not the case in India.  
After TRIPS and India’s patent laws changes, Novartis sought patent protection for the beta 
crystalline form of imatinib mesylate in 1998. The application was processed through a long 
period until 2006, when it got rejected on the grounds that it failed to satisfy novelty and non-
obviousness requirements. Novartis application was opposed by several generic drug 
companies such as Natco Pharma Ltd. [hereafter Natco] and an NGO cancer patient Aid 
Association on several grounds. They claimed that there was lack of novelty, non-obviousness 
in the application and also no significant enhanced efficacy was presented. All criteria required 
under Section 3(d) of the Indian Patent Law. Novartis was in this way accused for trying to 
evergreen its original formula. The Swiss company claimed in its defence that the Indian Patent 
Act didn’t meet the rules set down by the WTO and lodged appeals before the Madras High 
Court, which was then transferred to the newly formed Intellectual Property Appellate Board - 
IPAB17. The orders subject to appeal before the IPAB are those passed by the Registrar of 
Trademarks during rectification or opposition proceedings. 
The Appellate Board modified the previous decision, stating that novelty and non-obviousness 
were present in the application because actually the invention of the beta crystalline form of 
imatinib mesylate is new and inventive. However, the patent application had to be rejected on 
the grounds that the invention was not a new substance but an amended form of a known 
 
16 (Novartis v. Union of India & Others Civil Appeal No. 2706 – 2716 , 2013) 
17 The primary purpose for the establishment of the IPAB is to provide an appellate forum to expeditiously 
adjudicate upon appeals from the orders or decisions passed by the Registrar of Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications as well as the Controller of Patents.  
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compound. Novartis was unable to show increase in efficacy as laid down in section 3(d) of the 
Indian Patents Act. 
After this decision, Novartis then appealed the case to the Supreme Court through a Special 
Leave Petition. Novartis’s argument was based on the fact that the beta crystalline form 
presented more beneficial flow properties along with better thermodynamic stability, lower 
hygroscopicity and also an increased bioavailability.  
 
Figure 5 - Timeline of the Novartis case. 
 
Source: Gabble & Kohler (2014) 
After evaluating all the documents presented, the Court concluded that on the basis of the 
previous issued patents and literature all the improvements on flow properties, thermodynamic 
stability etc, presented by Novartis had nothing to do with therapeutic efficacy. 
Therefore, the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate did not meet the requirements of an 
“invention” as specified in the Indian Patents Act. 
The Court held that with regards to the genesis of Section 3(d), and more importantly to the 
circumstances in which this provision was amended, there were no doubts that the therapeutic 
efficacy of a medicine needs to be judged strictly and narrowly. Unfortunately, no therapeutic 
improvements were guaranteed by the beta crystalline form of imatinib mesylate. 
In April 2013, The Supreme Court of India rejected the Novartis patent application. 
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The SC judgement came as a huge relief for those people who couldn’t afford the lifesaving 
drugs manufactured by this big pharma giant. In a way, these companies who have already 
made billions of dollars prevent people from purchasing the drugs at low price thus endangering 
the very life of the poor people by acquiring patents over their drugs. The Supreme Court 
mentioned that a patent cannot be denied preventing a new invention under India’s Patent Act. 
However, the Supreme Court in its judgement made clear that India is a developing country and 
the availability of medicines at a cheap price is necessary for the lives of over 1 billion people. 
(Jeswani, 2016) Experts said that The Supreme Court was justified in its decision thereby 
prohibiting the evergreening approach in granting patents and granting patents only to genuine 
inventions as against frivolous inventions. (Collier, 2013) 
 
3.4.2. Abraxis Bioscience LLC v. Union of India – A case perspective18 
 
In 2008, Biocon Ltd, one of India's pioneering biotechnology companies, and Abraxis BioSci-
ence LLC [hereafter Abraxis Bioscience], a fully integrated biotechnology company announced 
the launch of ABRAXANE (paclitaxel formula) in India. The drug was approved in 2007 by 
the Drug Controller authorities of India and is used to treat a number of types of cancer, includ-
ing ovarian, breast, lung and pancreatic, among others. The approval was based on the clinical 
trial data that was the basis of approval in the United States. In 2010, Abraxis Bioscience Inc 
was acquired by New Jersey-based Celgene Corporation during 2010 and the upfront payment 
value of Abraxis BioSciences was at around $2.9 billion. 
The same year of the launch, the company faced a pre-grant opposition was filed by Natco 
Pharma, same opponent of Novartis in the previous case, which had launched Albupax, a bio-
similar drug. The Indian drug company claimed that the composition was merely a new form 
of a known substance and, hence, under Section 3 (d) of the Indian Patent Act was not patent-
able unless it exhibits enhanced efficacy. 
The Applicant clarified in the submission while replying to the other grounds of opposition of 
Natco Pharma that: “the excipients on acting on its own will yield no effect, whereas the sur-
prising effect conferred in the present [new] invention is only by the virtue of the therapeutic 
agent paclitaxel conjugated to the anti- SPARC antibody and not the excipients per se”.  
Considering both the claim of Natco Pharma and the provision of the Section 3(d) of Indian 
Patent Law, the Office refused the patent on Abraxis Bioscience. Basically, on the same 
grounds under which The Indian Patent Office refused the patent on Novartis – Section 3(d) – 
 




it also denied the privilege to the US firm’s anti-cancer drug by citing the lack of novelty and 
inventive step as the reasoning behind the denial. 
According to the Indian Patent Office, Abraxis Bioscience did not quote anywhere about the 
inventive features of the composition per se. The Applicant mentioned in the Court the Section 
59 of the Patents Act, as a basis for claiming the compound per se invention as composition of 
that compound. The Section 59 (1) claims that “No amendment of an application for a patent 
or a complete specification or any document related thereto shall be made except by way of 
disclaimer, correction or explanation, and no amendment thereof shall be allowed, except for 
the purpose of incorporation of actual fact, …” 
The Controller responded by citing the prior art and the previously issued patents hence agree-
ing with the Opponent - Natco Pharma - that the invention paclitaxel coupled to an anti-SPARC 
antibody or fragment thereof binds specifically to osteonectin (an already existing formula). 
This showed an absence of enhanced efficacy and in the case the application is not patentable 
under Section 3(d) of the Patents Act 1970. After that, Abraxis BioSciences appealed against 
the order in the Intellectual Property Appellate Board (IPAB). The IPAB concluded that there 
existed sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant had been denied of an opportunity to be 
heard despite having made specific requests to that effect. The Controller was therefore factu-
ally wrong in holding that no such request had been made within the prescribed time limit. 
Given the mandate of such an opportunity having to be provided to the parties, it was therefore 
clear that the appellant had been wrongly denied of his statutory right in this case.  
The IPAB considered the cases cited by the appellant and held in the appellant’s favour, stating 
that the Patent Office had wrongly considered an additional ground of opposition that had not 
been raised by Natco Pharma in its opposition petition. 
In January 2015, the IPAB directed the matter to be reheard by the Patent Office for fresh 
consideration, and to be decided within a specific time frame of 3 months. The matter was heard 
in April and a final decision was passed on June 2015, rejecting the application, again. 
In one of its articles that analysed this decision, India Writes Network wrote: ‘The rejection of 
the patent to the US-based company will encourage the Indian pharmaceutical companies in 
making generic versions of the drug available to India and other developing countries at a 
fraction of the original cost. The Indian pharmaceutical industry is already mired in a 
controversy over the production and export of cheaper varieties of drugs that have been 
reportedly pioneered by the western countries. Abraxis’ loss meant  another blow to the western 
pharmaceutical companies looking to improve sales in India and elsewhere, while marking a 





3.4.3. F. Hoffmann – La Roche AG v. Union of India – A case perspective19 
 
Another legal battle that generated much heat and dust in the pharma industry was the revoke 
of Valganciclovir patent to F. Hoffman - La Roche AG [hereafter Roche] in 2015. Valganciclo-
vir is an oral prodrug of Ganciclovir that is used in the treatment of cytomegalovirus infections, 
primarily in immunocompromised patients such as HIV/AIDS patients or patients who have 
undergone organ transplants. The drug is sold worldwide under brand name Valcyte by the 
Swiss pharma major. In India, the patent application for Valganciclovir was filed in 1995 and 
the patent was granted by the Indian Patent Office in 2007. 
The life-span of the granted patent of the drug was 20 years from the date of filing of the appli-
cation, hence until 2015. Roche filed in 2009 an application which was related to a powder 
version of Valganciclovir, in order to grant exclusivity protection around the drug. The com-
pany  also cut the retail price of its Valganciclovir hydrochloride drug by 35% in response to 
the central government’s budget recommendation to help the patients in need.  
The second application for the powder formulation by Roche was not appreciated by the generic 
companies such as Ranbaxy, Cipla, Bakul Pharma and Matrix Labs along with some patient 
organisations which filed a pre-grant opposition against the patent. Cipla’s joint managing di-
rector at the time, Amar Lulla said: “We welcome Roche’s decision to immediately pass on the 
custom duty cut to patients as it will reduce the prices to the patients, but the only thing we 
don’t want is the exploitation of patients by creating monopoly through evergreening of pa-
tents." The legal battle went on for years and was at the centre of many authorities like Supreme 
Court, high courts and IPAB. In 2015, in a setback to the drug manufacturer, the IPO rejected 
the company’s application to patent the powder formulation on the ground of lack of novelty. 
Deciding upon the efficacy of substance under the subject patent, the Controller observed that 
the new powder form of ganciclovir molecule has shown improvement in oral bioavailability 
than bis-valine ester of ganciclovir, whereas there was no support in the specification pertaining 
to efficacy. According to this, since no direct relation was shown for the improved bioavaila-
bility of new form of ganciclovir in the description with regard to significant difference in the 
efficacy, hence this new formulation was considered to be an equivalent substance. Thus, the 
Controller rules that the present patent was a ‘mere use of a known process’ which was not 
patentable under Section 3(d), Patents Act. The revocation of it in 2015, thus, coincided with 
the deadline of the original patent expiry. Hence, Roche joined the list of other multinationals 
in failing to secure patents in India for major drugs. 
 





3.5. What happened next? 
 
After losing its patent for "Gleevec," Novartis decided to retrieve from its plan on building a 
R&D centre in Hyderabad (India). The Swiss giant preferred to ‘move’ millions of dollars in 
planned investments away from India to other locations, primarily China. The U.S. industry 
trade group Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, or PhRMA, valuated the 
decision of the Supreme Court and the Indian Patent Office as a reflection of a deteriorating 
environment for innovation in the country. 
On the other side, Indian pharmaceuticals and medical experts weren’t surprised. In fact, this 
case cemented the role of local companies as big suppliers of inexpensive generics to India’s 
rapidly growing drugs market and also across the developing world. 
India's Cipla Ltd, Sun Pharma Ltd and Natco Pharma Ltd, kept selling their generics of Gleevec 
in India at around one-tenth of the price of the branded drug. From the public health point of 
view, it definitely helped Indian patients who couldn’t previously afford to buy the branded 
drug. Gabble & Kohler (2014) analysed the timeline of the Novartis case from different per-
spectives. That case set an important precedent for the global pharmaceutical industry and ide-
ally helped improve access to lifesaving medicines in the developing world. According to the 
authors, Novartis case illuminates how India is interpreting international law to fit domestic 
public health needs. 
While, after the final decision for the Abraxis BioScience’ drug Paclitaxel, Natco Pharma, was 
free to supply the market with its generic Albupax.  It was the first generic version of the inter-
national brand – Abraxane of Abraxis BioSciences, with sales of approximately US$375 mil-
lion. It has been indigenously developed by Natco in India and was the first albumin bound 
Paclitaxel in nanoparticle to be developed in India. Each 100 mg vial of Albupax has been 
priced at Rs 11,500 (one fifth of the branded drug price). This drug had the potential of becom-
ing the single largest brand amongst its basket of oncology products. But things changed. A 
few years later, in an unusual development, the Indian government stayed the suspension of 
Albupax manufacturing (product) licence by Natco Pharma Ltd. Natco’s manufacturing licence 
was suspended by the Drugs Controller General of India (DCGI) allegedly for not passing the 
test measuring endotoxin levels. This raised the sensibility also of the foreign markets regarding 
the efficacy of Indian drugs confirming somehow the reason behind the listing of India as one 
of the countries whose intellectual property rights regimes are of ‘concern’ to the US. While 
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Natco recalled all batches of Albupax from the market, other local companies Cipla Ltd, Pana-
cea Biotec Ltd and Fresenius Kabi Oncology India Ltd (formerly Dabur Pharma Ltd) intro-
duced their versions, lowering further the price of the drug. 
For the Valvanciclovir drug, Cipla launched the low-cost version of the drug under the brand 
name Valcept which price was at Rs 245 per tablet, compared to Roche’ s maximum retail 
price for Valcyte at over Rs 1,000. As per the Indian Patent Laws, a patent can be challenged 
within 12 months of the patent approval. In a new twist to the battle between domestic generic 
drug maker Cipla and Swiss drug major over the anti-infection drug Valganciclovir, the Bom-
bay High Court restrained Cipla from using the trademark 'Valcept' for its copycat version of 
Valcyte, Roche's patented brand. Later on, Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd, another generic major 
in the pharmaceutical industry, granted generic approval for valvanciclovir by the Indian Pa-
tent Office.  
 
3.5.1. Entering the US market: The Sun Pharma and Novartis evergreening settlement 
 
Going through the patent protection law in US in the first chapter, we learned about the ANDA 
applications that are managed by the FDA. This authority approves applications to market 
generic versions of brand-name drugs without repeating costly and duplicative clinical trials to 
establish safety and efficacy. In addition to the ANDA approval pathway, generic drug 
companies gained the ability to challenge patents in court prior to marketing as well as 180-day 
generic drug exclusivity.  The statute provides an incentive of 180 days of market exclusivity 
to the "first" generic applicant who challenges a listed patent by filing a paragraph IV 
certification and running the risk of having to defend a patent infringement suit. A paragraph 
IV certification begins a process in which the question of whether the listed patent is valid or 
will be infringed by the proposed generic product may be answered by the courts prior to the 
expiration of the patent. In some circumstances, an applicant who obtains 180-day exclusivity 
may be the sole marketer of a generic competitor to the innovator product for 180 days. Until 
an eligible ANDA applicant's 180-day exclusivity period has expired, FDA cannot approve 
subsequently submitted ANDAs for the same drug. Therefore, an ANDA applicant who is 
eligible for exclusivity is often in the position to delay all generic competition for the innovator 
product. 
From our analysis based on various articles and also on the announcements of the pharmaceu-
tical companies in their websites, some interesting facts were found following the three cases 
of study and the developments that followed. (Das, 2013) 
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Starting from Novartis, the decision to reject Novartis’ patent “had global significance since 
India’s generic drug industry, valued at approximately USD $26 billion, supplies much of the 
cheap medicine used in the developing world (Gabble & Kohler, 2014). But interesting steps 
occurred also in US pharma market. Novartis’ initial US patent on imatinib was set to expire in 
May 2013. However, Novartis filed for a patent term restoration approval at the US FDA Office 
and with that imatinib’s patent also received a paediatric exclusivity extension, which grants an 
additional 6 months of protection to pharmaceutical companies that respond to an FDA request 
to conduct a clinical trial in paediatric patients. As a result, the imatinib’s patent was extended 
to July 2015. In addition, Novartis sought numerous additional patents on imatinib. The well-
known secondary patents covered a different formulation of the active ingredient further ex-
tended its potential market exclusivity from July 2015 to November 2019 without offering ad-
ditional clinical benefits. 
Two months after the Supreme Court rejected Novartis’ plea to declare its Gleevec patent valid, 
the Indian drug major Sun Pharma sued Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp in the District Court of 
New Jersey. The Indian company wanted to introduce its generic of Gleevec (ANDA applica-
tion under Par IV) also in USA market. Sun Pharma demanded the rights to launch a generic 
version of the cancer drug before the Novartis patent expires. The complaint challenged the 
crystal form patent for Gleevec, which would expire in 2019. 
According to the US Patent Law, a generic drug applicant with a Para IV filing under the Hatch 
Waxman Act, is permitted to file a declaratory judgement suit against an innovator company if 
the ANDA applicant is not sued for infringing the patent within the 45-day period. Sun Pharma, 
which had made a Para IV filing for the drug in the US in 2006, claims Novartis missed its 45-
day window to file an infringement suit after it was informed of Sun Pharma's application for 
generic ANDA in August 2007. As Novartis did not launch the expected infringement suit 
against Sun Pharma after it received a notice from Sun, the Indian drug maker filed for a de-
claratory judgment in the US court, urging it be allowed to market a generic version of Gleevec. 
In May 2014, Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporation settled its litigation with the US subsidiary 
of Sun Pharmaceutical Industries relating to Novartis patents covering the use of certain poly-
morphic forms of Gleevec (imatinib mesylate), expiring in 2019. 
Sun Pharma was the first Indian company to receive the US FDA approval for generic Imatinib 
Mesylate tablets. Sun Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd said it was allowed to launch a generic 
version of Novartis’ leukaemia drug Gleevec in the United States on February 2016 under a 
settlement agreement between the two companies. 
It was also given the first-to-file status carrying 180-day exclusivity in 2015 when the soon to 
be off-patent Gleevec saw sales of around $2.5 billion in the US market. This definitely hold 
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advantages for the Indian drug maker. Not only it was able to sell its generic in the Indian 
market but it guaranteed access also to one of the biggest markets in the world, USA. One might 
view this as a success of patent law, as Novartis was permitted to file for patents that the 
company argued were substantive, and a generic manufacturer was granted earlier access. 
But the terms of the settlement agreement are otherwise confidential. Experts are worried that 
we had to do with another evergreening practice, pay-for-delay practice that occurred between 
the two companies. From one side, under Section 3(d) in India, the major generic manufacturer 
Sun Pharma got the right together with other pharma companies to develop their generics and 
supply the Indian market by gaining this way an important market share. And on the other hand, 
after India, it strategically applied for ANDA approval and got also the first-to file status 
carrying 180-day exclusivity in US, by challenging again the originator, Novartis. This time 
both parties reached a confidential settlement agreement which showed its effects later on. In 
fact, in 2016, this initial generic–branded duopoly does not lead to major price reductions. In 
the case of imatinib, Sun Pharma priced its generic product 30% below brand-name price. By 
comparison, in Canada, generic imatinib is sold for approximately 82% below brand-name price. 
This definitely might be part of the agreement between the two parties in order to preserve their 
‘powerful’ duopoly.  
Finally, although the imatinib active ingredient patent has expired, Novartis retained a second-
ary patent on the use of imatinib for the treatment of GIST and this patent expired only last year, 
in 2020. 
 
3.5.2. Entering the US market: Competing for the privilege of the first-to-file generic. 
 
Celgene acquired Abraxane with its $2.9 billion deal to buy Abraxis in 2010 and thanks to 
growing use as a therapy for pancreatic cancer, lung cancer, and breast cancer, Abraxane's sales 
topped $1 billion in 2018, with the number expected to continue to grow. Celgene should be 
able to count on Abraxane contributing to its top and bottom line in the U.S. until 2023 and in 
the EU until 2022. 
In 2016, a year after the final decision of the Supreme Court in India, Glenmark 
Pharmaceuticals, another multinational pharmaceutical company based in Mumbai, entered into 
a strategic Development, License and Commercialization agreement with Particle Sciences Inc. 
to develop and market a generic version of Celgene’s Abraxane product  
 As per the terms of the agreement, the company has obtained Global Exclusive Marketing and 
Distribution rights of the product upon commercialization. Particle Sciences is a US research-
based company that would develop this product exclusively for Glenmark and therefore receive 
certain milestone payments during various stages of the product’s development from the 
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company, including royalties on sales. Development of the product has been initiated for the 
USA market and the company filed the ANDA in 2019. 
Glenmark is known for its strategy of identifying and exploring external development partner-
ships to supplement and accelerate the growth of its existing pipeline and portfolio. 
On the other hand, Actavis, a subsidiary of Teva Pharmaceuticals was the first to file for ANDA 
approval of an Abraxane generic. Celgene started patent litigation with both companies for 
protecting its branded product. In 2018, Celgene reached an agreement with Actavis that 
terminated pending patent litigation over Abraxane. The settlement saw both parties file a 
consent judgment with the US District Court for the District of New Jersey to enjoin Actavis 
from selling a generic version of Abraxane until the patents expire. An inter parties review will 
also be terminated. Celgene provided Actavis with a licence supply the market with its generic 
form of Abraxane from March 31, 2022. Under which conditions? Those remain private 
between both companies. Glenmark on the other hand ended the development of the in-licensed 
complex generic of Abraxane in view of the extremely competitive landscape in the US. The 
Indian firm said it would rather focus on products where it is an early entrant. Just like Sun 
Pharma with the generic of Gleevec, alto this generic company aimed to be the first-to-file 
ANDA applicant. Two are the ways the situation might turn in these situations: either they go 
for out-of-court settlements with innovators (pay-for-delay settlements as strategies of 
evergreening) or try to win patent litigations so they can gain market exclusivity from 180-days 
up to 6 months according to the US Patent Law. 
When both generics, Actavis and Glenmark declared their intention on challenging the 
originator, Celgene had to settle and allow one of them to the market. Their earlier entry is 
followed by important price reductions. As soon as they got the approval of their generics and 
terminate the patent litigation with originators, generic pharma companies usually start a heavy 
marketing on its generic to convince pharmacists and doctors on prescribing their generics to 
patients results in a more advantageous situation to them. This case shows the power of generic 
drug manufacturers on shortening the patent length of the branded drugs. 
 
3.5.3. Entering the US market: another pay-for-delay settlement 
 
While the Swiss company, was defending its right to grant a patent for valganciclovir in India, 
Indian generic companies were ‘ attacking’ its ongoing patent in US. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd 
was one of the opponents which filed a pre-grant opposition against the patent of Roche in India. 
In 2008, Ranbaxy applied to the US FDA to manufacture and market valganciclovir under the 
name Valcyte for the US market, claiming that it was a known compound, for which it has only 
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received tentative approval so far. The patent granted by Roche in this market would expiry in 
September 2015 and it protected the compound valganciclovir [HCl] in crystalline form, other 
pharmaceutical compositions containing the compound, and methods of using the compound to 
treat herpes simplex virus and infections. 
Ranbaxy believed that in its First-to-File status on Valganciclovir tablets, thereby providing a 
potential of 180-days of marketing exclusivity, would offer a significant opportunity in the 
future. Roche immediately filed for patent litigation and the case went in front of the District 
Court of New Jersey. In September 2009, the Court rejected both Roche's bid for a judgment of 
patent infringement against Ranbaxy and Ranbaxy's request for a declaration that the patent-in-
suit was invalid.  Roche appealed the 2009 order, and Ranbaxy cross-appealed. The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted the parties' joint bid to send that matter back down 
to the district court for further proceedings consistent with the settlement agreement. 
The parties stipulated that the asserted patent was valid and enforceable.  Ranbaxy confirmed 
that its application for the approval of proposed generic was a technical act of infringement. 
would infringe the patent-at-issue. The deal allowed Ranbaxy to launch its generic product no 
later than March  2013, which means 2 years earlier that the originators patent expiry.  Ranbaxy 
would have 180 days of market exclusivity.  
The settlement's terms were confidential, just like in other cases, giving hints that Roche might 













                                               IV.  
                                Concluding Remarks 
 
 
4.1. The trade-off of the patenting system. 
 
The first chapter of this work introduced the importance of protecting the Intellectual Property 
Rights in order to have future innovation. Just like in any other industry, protecting the IPR and 
granting patenting rights is crucial to favour the introduction of new technological knowledge. 
A finding of the empirical literature is that if there is an increase in innovation due to patents, 
it is likely to be centred in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, and medical instrument areas, 
and possibly specialty chemicals. 
When considering the pharmaceutical industry, the need of granting patents is crucial in 
essential for giving the patent holder the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, or 
importing a patented invention. This, because of the specificity of such sector: here the patent 
is virtually the product itself and these products are really cheap to manufacture so without a 
patent protecting them, in a competitive market, the prices would be really affordable (see the 
case of generics). But in this situation, drug manufacturers would have no incentive on creating 
new technological inventions knowing that there will not be sufficient chances for them to 
recoup the high R&D costs. That’s why Arrow and Nelson presented the problem of 
underinvestment specifically in basic research and pointed out that inventors’ incentives to be 
inventive will suffer if they cannot appropriate the returns to their inventions A question was 
raised regarding the trade-off that the patenting system is associated with: What is best for the 
society, more available knowledge in the future or less accessible knowledge in the present? 
From one hand, a patent in the pharma sector (and in any other sector) unables for a specific 
period of time other innovators to use the existing patented innovation as a basis of further 
developments that would provide new drugs or processes in the market. This leaves the other 
undertakings with less accessible knowledge in the present. Let’s think at the example provided 
back on Chapter 1 regarding the hypothetical AstraPharma company. Other future originators 
had to wait until the patent expiry in order to be able to use the patented processes or drug 
molecules for building on future and sequential innovation. A trade-off situation is created, 
knowing also that not only the patent holder enjoys the privilege of setting a higher than 
competitive price of its product which results in a static inefficiency and a deadweight loss for 
the society, but also patent holder tries to extend this monopoly situation as long as he can 
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practicing evergreening.  On the other hand, patent protection allows the originators to recoup 
their R&D investments and pursue other future innovation.  
Much of the recent economic research on patents has been directed to attempting to answer this 
question and has found that the trade-off between a “patent monopoly” and “innovation 
incentive” is much more complex. So, finding an equilibrium is very difficult and no correct 
answer is currently available by the academia. 
O'Donoghue, et al. (2004) considered for example the influence of the length-breadth trade-off 
in the sequential innovation. In this case, follow-on innovations can shorten the effective life of 
a patent, so length and breadth are interrelated rather than being two separate policy tools. They 
find that very broad but finite-lived patents improve innovation and diffusion but that long and 
narrow patents can lower R&D costs by encouraging effort toward larger innovative steps. 
(O'Donoghue, et al., 2004) 
From all the literature and specific considerations made for the pharmaceutical sector in this 
work, we do acknowledge the essential need of granting patents and protecting IP rights for 
pharmaceutical products and processes, so I believe that ‘sacrificing’ knowledge in the present 
can be crucial for having more future innovation. On the other hand, authorities and regulations 
should be more attentive on banning to those unlawful practices such as evergreening that 
would break this equilibria. How? Possible solutions are presented in the next paragraph. 
 
4.2. Evergreening in pharma: suggesting solutions. 
 
Coming up with something the world has never seen requires a lot of energies. And when we 
refer to the pharmaceutical sector, it can take up many years. Patent clock starts much early in 
drug development. Most of the countries provide a 20-year exclusivity for a patented drug but 
considerable amount of this time is lost during the regulatory application and approval process. 
Sometimes, making some adjustments to something old, evergreen it and calling it new might 
be easier. Think about some simple acts in everyday life when by recovering a vintage dress 
from your grandmas’ closet and matching it with just a pair of the latest trend earrings, you can 
call it a complete full new look. In simple words, pharmaceutical firms do the same with the 
soon to go off-patent drugs. They perform some new adjustments on some of the secondary 
characteristics of those drugs and file for further patent protection for those sometimes not-
essential improvements. Takes less time, less effort and can brings them further benefits.  
So, just like any other sector, it is natural for any innovator firm to resort to lawful and unlawful 
practices such as evergreening so as to recover the heavy costs incurred by them, but with time 
these practices have become too aggressive.  
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There are several official20 and unofficial methods to extend term of a patent beyond 20 years. 
Unofficial methods include altering or reformulating the existing compound to obtain a new 
patent by utilising polymorphism, creating combinations, OTC switching, etc 
The evergreening practices have been at the centre and main object of interest of this work. 
Chapter 1 fully described how actually pharmaceutical firms perform these strategies and which 
are the typical moves a company does to evergreen its patent. We provided real examples of 
evergreening in the pharma industry and it was easy to understand that most of the pharma 
giants play the card of evergreening for their blockbuster drugs. 
So, the patent holder attempts to exploit the loopholes in patent laws and related regulatory 
processes in order to prolong their non-competitive position especially over blockbuster drugs. 
These firms file disguised or artful patents on previously patented invention just before the end 
of the term of the parent patent. (Kumar & Nanda, 2007) 
Many have been the discussions regarding these practices on whether evergreening strategies 
are doing good or bad to the industry itself, to the competition in the market and how they are 
influencing the social welfare and public health. Experts and studies are divided in 2 extremely 
different sides: defenders and critics of evergreening in pharma.  
In summary, critics of the innovator pharmaceutical industry argue that these incremental 
improvements to the pharmaceutical products/ processes behind the evergreening tactics are 
just a low-risk way of cashing in more money. 
In reply those defending the industry have argued that the term is inherently pejorative. They 
observe that most technological advances occur incrementally and many improvement patents 
cover advances that are of considerable practical significance to patients and other consumers. 
In addition, patents on improvements do not impede the ability of competitors to market 
products that were covered by expired patents on original technologies.  
This work doesn’t actually pick a side regarding evergreening. It is not the purpose of it to 
advance this debate but rather to consider and furnish the right solutions to the problem. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to measure in terms of financials, the effect that these practices 
have but based on famous cases of strategic patenting in the pharma history we can say 
evergreening affects prices, litigation costs and the innovation level in the industry. Obtaining 
secondary patents through evergreening for not effective improvements unfairly shields a 
pharmaceutical product from generic or biosimilar competition, thereby resulting in higher 
prices. Also, the cost of litigation which is around 1.8 million doesn't help in challenging these 
 
20 Official methods include provisions by some regulatory bodies such as Data exclusivity, Orphan drug 




patents. Small generic competitors cannot afford to do it. But on the same time, improvements 
can be made on every original invention. There are cases in pharma history when through 
evergreening pharma companies have eliminated the side effects of the original drug by 
improving it on terms of formulation, dosage etc. on it. And sometimes the value of a follow-
on patent is comparable to or even might exceed that of a primary patent. So how can the 
problem of evergreening be directed? 
It all stays in the provisions and regulations of patent protection. As already described in 
developed countries like USA and that of the European Union, the patent laws are too lenient 
to check ever-greening practices. Through the years it seems that pharmaceutical companies 
have forgotten their main role on contributing in healthcare and are focusing more on their 
business side, thinking all about profits. When it comes to evergreening, the reason these artful 
strategies can be performed are the loopholes in patents laws and regulations. Authorities should 
focus more on improving them and be more attentive to patent applications.  With the Novartis 
case, India for example gave a clear and strong indication that it would not risk life of poor 
patients and the public health by permitting evergreening of drug patents. The judgment in 
Novartis case also gave a strong message to the world and the innovator firms that India will 
provide extended market monopoly to pharmaceutical companies only if a medicine is 
genuinely shown to be innovative and there is a significant enhancement in the efficacy. Even 
though defining the standards on how to prove this enhancement in efficacy might be precepted 
in different ways by different authorities, we believe that is key on preventing harmful 
evergreening strategies. On doing that literature and experts might help. Luckily there are many 
studies on these strategies that provide possible solutions to the phenomenon. More stricter 
controls also are required when approving and granting new patents and previous 
pharmaceutical scandals may help on preventing future ones. All these moves should be done 
for the same and essential objective: to bring patients innovative new therapies that help them 
to live longer, healthier lives. 
 
4.3. Is Section 3(d) consistent with TRIPS? 
 
In Chapter 3, the main attention was directed towards India and its relationship with patent 
protection laws in pharmaceuticals and how it manages the evergreening practices in such 
industry. Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act prevents the attempts of pharmaceutical companies 
who wish to seek evergreening of patents in India by filing patent on different attributes of the 
same drug to enjoy extended monopoly and delay of the availability of cheap generic versions. 
Various threats and veiled attacks are mounted on the Indian Patent system by United States 
and European Union to remove Section 3(d) claiming that it discriminates western pharma 
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companies and is not consistent with TRIPS Agreement. After the Novartis case judgements, 
the situation got very heated. The Swiss drug company accused Indian Government and the 
Indian Patent Act for being unreasonable towards the protection of innovation in the industry 
suggesting especially that Section 3(d) does not comply with the essential regulations of TRIPS. 
The effect was the same also for the other 2 cases treated in the previous chapter. Big pharma 
claimed that granting a patent protection in India was not consistent with the already established 
standards of the international Agreement, TRIPS and Section 3(d) is discriminatory towards the 
foreign western pharma companies. 
Many have been the studies that have tried to compare various policy regimes in the world and 
analysing the Indian regulations in this light. Many different interpretations were given in the 
context of the Novartis case for example regarding what type of standards Section 3(d) actually 
establishes. Correa (2010) analysed this case starting from the main concept of TRIPS. As 
previously mentioned, when introduced the main international patent law in Chapter 1, the 
Agreement allows to all WTO members the flexibility on defining what is an ‘invention’ for 
the purposes of their patent law. Hence, different WTO members can adopt different concepts 
in accordance to their national policies. According to Correa (2010), the policy space left by 
the TRIPS Agreement allows national laws to define what inventions are patentable and which 
are not. In particular, the TRIPS does not specify the standard of ‘non obviousness’ or 
‘inventive step’. So, given this important flexibility, WTO members can also adopt the 
patentability criteria to avoid in this case evergreening of pharmaceutical patents. For India, 
Section 3(d) is the provision for preventing these tactics and is fully compliant on what TRIPS 
allows to all WTO members. The author agrees that Section 3(d) is perfectly compatible with 
the TRIPS Agreement and also enshrines the right policy approach in dealing with 
pharmaceutical patents: protection should be granted when genuine inventions are made and 
rejected when patent applicants just aim to create barriers to generic competition by patenting 
minor insignificant modifications. While for the discriminatory hypothesis against western 
pharma, the author concluded that this provision is not discriminatory in terms of Article 27.1 
of TRIPS as long as it doesn’t create neither different nor additional requirements other than 
those specified in the said article. (Correa, 2010) 
 
4.4. India towards specialty medicines 
 
The Indian pharmaceutical industry has been facing a transition from being nowhere on the 
global pharma map in 1970 to playing key role in delivering high-quality and affordable generic 
drugs worldwide. In the previous chapters, we looked at the factors behind its evolution and 
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highlighted some of the recent domestic and international challenges and trends which have 
resulted in a period of more volatile growth. 
 
Figure 6: Yearly trends of Pharma sales and R&D investments  
 
Source: Deloitte analysis of the Annual reports of top five Indian pharma companies (by revenue) 
 
The IQVIA Institute (2019) studies the approaches that Indian pharma companies are working 
to establish sustainable revenue streams and cost leadership strategies. A trend that caught our 
eye is the continuous shift towards specialty medicines. In fact, in response to the erosion of 
generic drugs prices in the US and Europe, generic drug manufacturers in India are exiting drug 
portfolios where margins are deemed unsustainable and focusing on developing differentiated 
complex generics of specialty medicines. Shifting towards complex generics and specialty 
drugs has required companies to increase their R&D investment.  When we analysed the 3 case 
studies in Chapter 3, it was easy to notice that all three of them had specialty drugs at their 
centre: Iminatib against cancer, Valganciclovir against HIV/AIDS and Abraxane for treating 
different types of cancer. 
This shift in focus is primarily due to the fact that complex generics are harder to develop, face 
less competition and command higher margins than generics. Indian pharma companies also 
aim to be the first-to-file and first-to-market complex generics especially in US market, to gain 
a competitive advantage.  
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To confirm this trend, we can recall for example Sun Pharma’s strategy towards being the first 
generic company to provide the US market with its version of iminatib.  Sun Pharma was the 
first-to-file generic of iminatib drug sold by Novartis under the brand name Gleevec so the 
Indian company gained the first to market exclusivity for its generic. Not only the company 
entered in a evergreening settlement with the major pharma Novartis, delaying its entry until 
established but also gained the privilege of being the only generic for 180-days in the market. 
It created duopoly situation with the originator Novartis which led to only a small reduction of 
the drug price (only 30% in US compared to nearly 70% in Canada). Practicing still a high price 
for its generic brought enormous profits to the Indian generic company. So, this definitely 
explains why Indian generics are ‘abandoning’ simple molecules that require no costs in R&D 
sold cheaper price and focusing on more complex ones that bring in more profits.  
 
4.5. Section 3(d). To prevent or to promote? 
 
Section 3(d) of India’s Patent Act prevents the attempts of pharmaceutical companies who wish 
to seek evergreening of patents in India by filing patent on different attributes of the same drug 
to enjoy extended monopoly and delay of the availability of cheap generic versions. This would 
certainly facilitate early entry of generic medicines into the market and the impact would be felt 
not only in India but also across other countries that depend on Indian generic medicines. 
Consequentially, threats and veiled attacks are mounted on the Indian Patent system by United 
States and European Union to remove Section 3(d). In fact, while looking at the three case 
studies (and not only), the denial of granting patent protection by the Indian Patent Law 
naturally allowed free space to the Indian generic pharma to supply the market with cheaper 
generics. Being specialty drugs, as these medicines would treat different types of cancer and 
HIV/AIDS, and having the possibility of offering generic versions at one-tenth or one-fifth of 
the branded drug price was definitely a victory for the patients in need but also for the country’s 
Patent Law which had at the centre of  its objectives, protecting the healthcare of its population. 
Section 3(d) was the determinant on the final decisions of the Supreme Court of India for the 
three case studies. On one hand, Indian authorities claimed to have prevented strategies of 
evergreening in pharmaceuticals and that the entry of generics was inevitable into the market. 
After understanding the impact it had on this market, we raise questions regarding  the real 
effect of the Section 3(d) in terms of evergreening in pharmaceuticals outside India, specifically 
in the US market.   
Is this provision ‘fighting’ evergreening by filling patent challenges to the western pharmaceu-
tical companies not only in the country but also outside it? As we’ve seen in the meantime or 
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shortly after the final decision of the SC of India regarding the case of Novartis, Abraxis Bio-
science and Roche, Indian generics filed ANDAs for their generics approval challenging under 
Paragraph 4 of US Patent Law the current patents granted to the innovators and claiming that 
they were based on previously known compounds. These generic firms gained time in devel-
oping their generics in India for moving then in international markets such as US. 
The Indian drug manufacturers aimed for the first-to-file position of generic. This would guar-
antee them according to the eventual Court decision 180-days up to 6 months of market exclu-
sivity of their generic, blocking this way the other generics entry, and gaining good profits. One 
may think that their ANDA approvals according to the law would end in patent litigation from 
the patent owner. And that is true. Novartis for example sued Sun Pharma for infringing its 
patent. The suit went along for around 3 years with extremely high litigation costs up to $1,8 
million. Why would Indian generics run the risk of getting sued in the US by originators? Firstly, 
in case of approval of their ANDAs as the first-to-file generic bring them huge profits as we 
have to do with generics of important specialty drugs. Secondly, court trials most of the time 
end with private settlements between the originator and the generic drug manufacturer creating 
this way a situation of duopoly in the market. These settlements can be pay-for-delay agree-
ments (evergreening) in which the originator, in this case Novartis, pays huge amounts of 
money in order to convince the generic to postpone its entry and then license it by giving it the 
exclusivity  shortly before the patent expiration to sell its generic drug.  
Introduced in Chapter 1, these private settlements are just evergreening tactics performed by 
pharmaceutical companies to extend their non-competitive position. 
 
Are Indian generic manufacturers seeing this opportunity of demanding the patent removal of 
specialty medicines under Section 3(d) in order to base their long-term strategy for entering the 
US market?  
Finally, we close this work raising some questions regarding the eventual opposite effect that 
Section 3(d) might have on promoting other evergreening strategies in the US market of phar-
maceuticals.  
Is this provision creating a boomerang effect by increasing rather than fighting the evergreening 
practices (i.e., pay-for-delay settlements) between the Indian generics and the big western 
pharma in US?  Should the US authorities consider these specific strategies and interfere in the 
ANDA approvals under Para IV?  
We do believe that these and other questions should be object of interest for further studies on 
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